












THE PAUL WOOLLEY CENTRE  
WORKING PAPER SERIES NO 7 






















Dong Lou has been teaching at the London School of Economics since July 2009. He 
earned a Ph.D. in Finance from Yale University and a B.S. in Computer Science from 
Columbia University. Lou’s research mostly focuses on understanding market 
inefficiencies, and their distortionary effects on resource allocation (such as capital and 
managerial effort) in the real economy. In his Ph.D. dissertation, Lou shows that mutual 
fund investment-flow induced trading can have a long-lasting return effect in the stock 
market. In some follow-up projects, Lou further studies the potential effects of such 
temporary price pressure on firms’ debt financing and investment decisions, and firms’ 
interactions with non-equity stakeholders, such as suppliers and customers. Any 
opinions expressed here are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the FMG. 
The research findings reported in this paper are the result of the independent research 
of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the LSE.  
A Flow-Based Explanation for Return Predictability ∗
Dong Lou†
London School of Economics
First Draft: April 2008
This Draft: November 2009
Abstract
This paper proposes and tests an investment-flow based explanation for three empirical
findings on return predictability – the persistence of mutual fund performance, the “smart
money” effect, and stock price momentum. Since mutual fund managers generally scale up
or down their existing positions in response to investment flows, and the portfolios of funds
receiving capital generally differ from those that lose capital, investment flows to mutual funds
can cause significant demand shocks in individual stocks. Moreover, given that mutual fund
flows are largely predictable from past fund performance and past flows, this paper further
establishes that flow-induced price pressure is predictable. Finally, this paper shows that such
flow-based return predictability can fully account for mutual fund performance persistence and
the “smart money” effect, and can partially explain stock price momentum.
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1 Introduction
Past research has documented that a) mutual fund performance is persistent, b) money flows
disproportionately to mutual funds that outperform in the future (i.e., the “smart money” effect),
and c) individual stocks exhibit price momentum. This paper argues that all three empirical
regularities are importantly driven by a single mechanism: the price pressure generated by capital
flows from individual investors to mutual funds, and then from mutual funds to individual stocks.
The flow-based mechanism is sustained by two empirical facts. First, the amount of capital
flows across mutual funds are enormous, typically in the magnitude of trillions of dollars each year.1
Second, mutual funds receiving capital generally hold different stocks from those that lose capital,
as capital flows have been shown to chase certain portfolio characteristics (e.g. past performance).2
If investment flows do not contain useful information about individual stock returns, managers
are expected to (roughly) scale up or down their existing holdings in response to capital flows, so
as to maintain their optimal portfolio weights. Given the magnitude and the directional nature
of mutual fund flows, such flow-induced trading can cause significant price pressure in individual
stocks – an effect I label flow-induced price pressure. Moreover, since mutual fund flows can be
largely forecasted from past fund performance and past fund flows, flow-induced trading and the
resulting price pressure are also predictable.
This mechanism of return predictability can give rise to mutual fund performance persistence.
Since capital flows strongly chase past fund performance, stocks that are held by past winning
funds are likely to experience flow-induced purchases in the subsequent period, while stocks held
by past losing funds experience flow-induced sales. This can lead the former to outperform the
latter subsequently; as a result, past winning funds continue outperforming past losing funds.
Similarly, the flow-based mechanism can lead to the “smart money” effect. Given that mutual
fund flows are highly persistent, stocks that are widely held by funds with capital inflows in the
current period are expected to experience additional flow-induced purchases in the next period,
and the reverse is true for stocks held by funds with current outflows. Consequently, funds with
inflows outperform those with outflows subsequently.
1According to the Investment Company Institute, the gross capital flows (purchases plus redemptions) to all equity
mutual funds exceeded $1.4 trillion in the first eight months of 2009.
2See, for example, Ippolito (1992); Gruber (1996); Chevalier and Ellison (1997); Sirri and Tufano (1998).
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Finally, flow-based return predictability can also cause the stock price momentum effect. Win-
ning funds attract inflows from investors, and in turn scale up their existing holdings, which are
(by definition) concentrated in winning stocks. In other words, investors in mutual funds are indi-
rectly buying the winning stocks of the previous period by purchasing the shares of winning funds.
Similarly, investors are indirectly selling losing stocks by redeeming shares in losing funds. As a
result, performance-chasing mutual fund flows drive past winning stocks to outperform past losing
stocks in the subsequent period.
The mechanism of flow-induced return predictability offers a unified explanation for mutual
fund performance persistence, the smart money effect, and stock price momentum, which in the
literature are attributed to distinct mechanisms – heterogeneity in managerial skills, investors’
ability to identify superior skills, and investors’ underreaction to news, respectively. The key
feature of the flow-based explanation, that differentiates it from alternative models, is the interplay
between mutual fund performance and stock returns. Rather than suggesting a direct link between
a stock’s (fund’s) past performance and its own future performance, this mechanism maintains that
the expected stock return is partially determined by the past performance of mutual funds that
are holding the stock; and similarly, the expected fund performance is partially driven by the past
performance of all other mutual funds that are holding overlapping positions with the fund.
To formally test the flow-induced price pressure hypothesis and the resulting return predictabil-
ity, I construct a variable that captures the price impact of mutual fund flow-induced trading in two
steps. In the first step, I estimate the part of mutual fund trading that is motivated by investment
flows and find that, while managers on average scale down their positions dollar-for-dollar with
redemptions, they partially scale up their existing positions, by sixty-two cents for every dollar of
inflow. Based on the partial-scaling results, I then compute a flow-induced price pressure (FIPP )
variable for each stock in each quarter by aggregating flow-induced trading across all mutual funds.
The data yield strong support for the flow-induced price pressure hypothesis. The return
spread between the top and bottom deciles sorted by FIPP is 5.19% in the portfolio-formation
quarter, insignificant in the following year, and -7.20% in years two and three. Expected flow-
induced price pressure (E[FIPP ]), constructed from expected mutual fund flows, delivers similar
results. The difference in stock returns between the top and bottom deciles ranked by E[FIPP ] is
5.28% in the year after portfolio formation and -5.67% in quarters six to twelve. I also construct
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an expected flow-induced price pressure measure for each mutual fund, defined as the portfolio-
weighted average expected FIPP (denoted E[FIPP ∗]). Consistent with the stock return results,
the spread between fund returns of the top and bottom deciles sorted by E[FIPP ∗] is 4.80% in
the year following portfolio formation, and a total of -4.62% in quarters six to twelve. The return
patterns, both at the stock level and the mutual fund level, are consistent with the hypothesis that
mutual fund flow-induced trading can cause temporary demand shocks and that the demand shocks
are predictable.
I then examine the degree to which the flow-based mechanism is responsible for the three
aforementioned empirical regularities about return predictability. The results suggest that this
mechanism can fully account for mutual fund performance persistence and the smart money effect,
and can partially explain stock price momentum. Specifically, I find that, in a conditional sort
of mutual funds first by E[FIPP ∗] and then by fund alpha, fund alpha no longer predicts future
abnormal fund returns; but in the conditional sort of the reverse order (i.e., first by alpha and then
by E[FIPP ∗]), E[FIPP ∗] remains significant in predicting future fund performance. This implies
that fund alpha contains little information about future fund performance beyond its correlation
with E[FIPP ∗]. Similarly, I show that fund flows are also completely subsumed by E[FIPP ∗] in
predicting abnormal fund performance. These results contrast with existing theories, and indicate
that the evidence of mutual fund performance persistence and the smart money effect is more
consistent with the flow-driven price pressure hypothesis.
To answer the question of what drives the individual stock price momentum effect, I conduct
a regression analysis that includes both past stock returns and E[FIPP ] on the right hand side
of the equation. The results indicate that after controlling for E[FIPP ], the magnitude of price
momentum declines by 25–50%, depending on the data sample and the way the variables are
constructed. In particular, E[FIPP ] accounts for a larger part of the price momentum effect in
the latter half of the sample and among large-cap stocks, consistent with the observation that
mutual fund holdings are more important in more recent years and among large-cap stocks.
The results in this paper complement a number of recent studies on the potential price impact
of mutual fund flows. Warther (1995), Edelen and Warner (2001), Gompers and Metrick (2001),
Goetzmann and Massa (2003), Teo and Woo (2004), and Braverman, Kandel, and Wohl (2007) find
that aggregate capital flows to mutual funds in a particular sector (e.g., equity vs. fixed income) or
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a particular investment style (e.g., value vs. growth) negatively predict subsequent sector or style
returns. The closest work to mine is Coval and Stafford (2007), who examine the price impact of
extreme mutual fund flows on individual stocks.3 This paper differs from Coval and Stafford (2007)
in two important aspects. First, this paper adopts a more general method for the identification of
flow-induced trading. While Coval and Stafford focus exclusively on mutual funds with extreme
investment flows (which usually are smaller funds) and assume that all trades under extreme-flow
scenarios are non-discretionary or flow-driven, this study estimates flow-induced trading for all
mutual funds by scaling up or down each of their positions based on the partial-scaling mechanism.
In doing so, I am able to construct a much more comprehensive sample of mutual funds and stocks,
which affords me the possibility to study the implications of flow-induced price pressure for prior
findings in the asset pricing literature. Second and more importantly, the two papers have different
goals and implications. While Coval and Stafford focus on the price effect of fire sales in the equity
market, this paper tests the return predictability resulting from mutual fund flow-induced trading
and its relation to some previously documented empirical regularities.
This paper is also related to the extensive literature on mutual fund herding and momentum
trading. For example, Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992), Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers
(1995), Nofsinger and Sias (1999), Wermers (1999), and Sias (2004) find strong evidence of in-
stitutional investors’ tendencies to trade in the same direction, and to chase past stock returns.
Most prior studies attribute herding to correlated information, social learning, reputation concerns,
and fads. This paper offers an additional explanation for herding and momentum trading; in the
context of this study, the persistence and the performance-chasing nature of investment flows from
retail investors drive institutional investors to trade together and to follow momentum strategies.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the datasets and the screening procedures.
Section 3 formally defines flow-induced price pressure and analyzes its impact on stock returns and
fund performance. Section 4 and 5 study the implications of the flow-based mechanism for mutual
fund performance predictability and stock price momentum, respectively. Section 6 examines an
alternative explanation and performs robustness tests. Section 7 discusses potential interpretations
of the results in this paper. Finally, section 8 concludes.
3Frazzini and Lamont (2008) also look at the effect of mutual fund flows on individual stock returns, but the
measure used in their paper is a combination of mutual fund discretionary trading and flow-induced trading.
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2 Data
2.1 Mutual Fund Data
Mutual fund holdings data are obtained from the CDA/Spectrum database provided by Thompson
Financial for the period 1980 – 2006. The database is compiled from mandatory SEC filings, as well
as voluntary disclosures by mutual funds. Most mutual funds in the database report their holdings
on a quarterly basis, even though for a large part of the sample period they are only required to
report semi-annually. Although every fund files its report at the end of a quarter, the date on which
the holdings are valid (report date) is often different from the filing date; sometimes the filing date
can be a few quarters after the report date. To calculate the number of shares held by each mutual
fund at the end of a quarter, I assume the manager does not trade between the report date and
the quarter end (adjusted for stock splits).
Total net assets, monthly returns, expense ratios, and 12(b)1 fees are obtained from the CRSP
mutual fund database. I use the pre-expense fund returns in the study (i.e., monthly net returns
plus 1/12 of annual expenses and fees).4 For funds with multiple share classes reported in CRSP,
I sum up the total net assets (TNA) in each share class to derive the TNA of the fund. For net
returns and expense ratios, I compute the TNA-weighted average across all share classes. For other
fund characteristics, I use the value from the share class with the largest total net assets. Moreover,
I calculate the fund alpha using a 12-month rolling window. Specifically, at the end of each quarter,
I run a time-series regression of monthly fund returns in the previous twelve months on the Carhart
four factors and take the intercept as the fund alpha of the prior year.5
To merge CDA/Spectrum data with CRSP data, I rely on the Mutual Fund Links dataset
provided by Russ Wermers on Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). According to the WRDS
manual, MFLinks maps over 90% of domestic equity funds between the two data sources with high
accuracy.
Since this study focuses on the price impact of aggregate flow-induced trading in the equity
market, I include all domestic equity mutual funds in the sample. Specifically, I require the in-
vestment objective code reported by CDA/Spectrum to be aggressive growth, growth, growth and
4Monthly returns reported by CRSP are net returns (i.e., after fees, expenses, and brokerage commissions but
before any front-end or back-end loads).
5I also compute fund alpha based on monthly returns in the prior two and three years and obtain similar results.
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income, balanced, unclassified, or missing. This restriction effectively excludes all fixed-income
funds, international funds, and precious metal funds. However, due to limited coverage of sector
funds and balanced funds in the Mutual Fund Links, a significant number of funds are lost in the
merging process. As a robustness check, I further restrict the sample to only diversified equity
funds by removing balanced and sector funds from the sample, and the results are by and large
unchanged.
Moreover, since some mutual funds misreport their investment objective codes, I also require
the ratio of equity holdings to total net assets to be between 0.75 and 1.2. The lower bound is to
make sure that the return from the equity portfolio accounts for a significant portion of the total
fund return while the upper bound is to get rid of some apparent data errors. To further ensure
data quality, I require a minimum fund size of $1M and that the TNAs reported by CDA and
CRSP do not differ by more than a factor of two (i.e., 0.5 < TNACDA/TNACRSP < 2).
With the aforementioned screening procedures, I obtain a sample of 77,983 fund-quarter obser-
vations and 2,989 distinct mutual funds. Table I shows the number of funds in each year along with
the summary statistics on fund size and fund equity holdings. There is a significant rising trend
in both the number of funds and the average fund size. Moreover, the distribution of fund size
is heavily right skewed; in most years, the median fund size is less than a quarter of the average
fund size. Finally, the fraction of the equity market value held by mutual funds in the sample rises
steadily from less than 2.3% in 1980 to about 14% in 2006.
2.2 Fund Flows
Following prior studies (e.g., Chevalier and Ellison (1997); Sirri and Tufano (1998)), I compute the
investment flows of fund i in quarter t as:
FLOWi,t = TNAi,t − TNAi,t−1 ∗ (1 + reti,t)−MGNi,t, (1)
where MGNi,t is the increase in TNA due to a fund merger in quarter t. Neither CRSP nor
CDA/Spectrum reports the exact date on which a merge takes place. Following the literature,
I use the last NAV report date of the acquiree to proxy for the merge date. Since this simple
method produces many obvious mismatches, I employ the following smoothing procedure. I match
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an acquiree to its acquirer from t-1 to t+5, where t is the last report date, I then pick the month
that gives me the smallest absolute percentage flow as the event month. Implicitly, I assume that
inflows and outflows occur at the end of a quarter, and that investors reinvest their dividends and
capital appreciation distributions in the same fund. I further assume that after a merger, investors
place all their money in the surviving fund. Funds that are initiated have inflows equal to their
initial TNA, while funds that are liquidated have outflows equal to their terminal TNA.
2.3 Other Data
Stock returns, trading volume, and the number of shares outstanding are obtained from the CRSP
monthly stock file. In order to avoid microstructure issues, I exclude all stocks whose prices are
below five dollars a share and whose market capitalizations are in the bottom decile of NYSE stocks
at the beginning of the holding period.
Stock liquidity data are obtained from Joel Hasbrouck’s website. Among the various measures
provided in the dataset, three are used in the current study: the Gibbs estimate of effective bid-ask
spreads computed from the Basic Market-Adjusted model (cBMA), and the Gibbs estimates of γ0
and γ1 from the Latent Common Factor model. Since the results are qualitatively the same with
all three measures, only those derived with cBMA are reported. For a more detailed discussion of
various measures of stock liquidity, see Hasbrouck (2006).
3 Flow-Induced Price Pressure
Flow-induced trading can cause demand shocks in individual stocks. If the market for liquidity
provision is not perfect (e.g., due to market frictions), such demand shocks can affect stock returns.
Prior studies on the price impact of mutual fund flows have focused on the effect of aggregate
investment flows to the equity market or a particular investment style. Warther (1995) documents
a positive relation between aggregate flows to equity mutual funds and contemporaneous market
returns. Using a more refined dataset on daily investment flows, Edelen and Warner (2001) and
Goetzmann and Massa (2003) show that mutual fund flows lead intra-day index returns. Two
recent papers, Teo and Woo (2004) and Braverman, Kandel, and Wohl (2007) find that aggregate
flows to a sector or an investment style negatively predict future sector or style returns, providing
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some evidence of the price pressure hypothesis. More recently, Coval and Stafford (2007) study the
price effect of fire sales (i.e., extreme fund flows) in the stock market. In this section, I test the
temporary price pressure effect of mutual fund flow-induced trading (defined in a general way) on
individual stocks.6
3.1 Partial Scaling
How should mutual fund managers respond to investment flows? In a simplified model without
liquidity constraints, nor wealth effect (i.e., managers have CARA utility functions), managers’
portfolio choices are independent of fund size. Put it different, if investment flows to mutual funds
are uninformative about individual stock returns, fund managers should proportionally scale up
or down their existing holdings based on their inflows or outflows. Clearly, in the actual financial
market with significant liquidity costs, holdings are not infinitely scalable.7 As a result, managers
may deviate from this perfect scaling scheme in some situations.
There are three things that managers can do to mitigate the liquidity costs associated with
capital flows. First, they can use a cash buffer to reduce the impact of flows in the short run, but
this is not a long-term solution as keeping a large cash reserve is very costly.8 Second, managers can
choose to expand their current positions only by a fraction of their inflows and use the remainder to
initiate new positions. In other words, managers can partially scale up their current holdings if the
costs of scaling up outweight the potential benefits. The portfolio-level partial scaling, however,
is not feasible for outflows; managers have to scale down dollar-for-dollar to meet redemptions.
Finally, managers can scale up or down each of their holdings differently based on each stock’s
scaling costs; for example, they can let their more liquid and smaller positions absorb more of the
capital flows.
I gauge the effect of trading costs on the degree of partial scaling with the following panel
regression, which is equivalent to a decomposition of fund trading into a flow-induced component
6This is essentially a joint test of a) whether capital flows to mutual funds are informative about individual stock
returns and b) whether demand shocks can affect stock returns.
7For example, Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik (2004) and Pollet and Wilson (2008) find that fund size is negatively
related to expected fund returns.
8Coval and Stafford (2007) find that actively managed mutual funds maintain about 4-5% of their total net assets
in cash, and this ratio stays steady over time.
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and an information-driven component (the residual term).
∆sharesi,j,t =β0 + β1 percflowi,t + β2 owni,j,t−1 + β3 percflowi,t ∗ owni,j,t−1+
β4 liqcostj,t−1 + β5 percflowi,t ∗ liqcostj,t−1 + β6 owni,t−1+ (2)
β7 percflowi,t ∗ owni,t−1 + β8 liqcosti,t−1 + β9 percflowi,t ∗ liqcosti,t−1,
where sharesi,j,t is the number of shares held by fund i in stock j at the end of quarter t, and
sharessplit adji,j,t−1 is the number of shares held at the end of quarter t-1 adjusted for stock splits in
quarter t; ∆sharesi,j,t =
sharesi,j,t
sharessplit adji,j,t−1
− 1 is the percentage change in shares held from quarter t-1
to t; percflowi,t =
FLOWi,t
TNAi,t−1 is the investment flow in quarter t, as a percentage of the TNA at
the end of the previous quarter; ωi,j,t−1 is the portfolio weight in stock j at the end of quarter
t-1; owni,j,t−1 =
sharesi,j,t−1
shroutj,t−1 is the ownership share held by mutual fund i in stock j (i.e., the
fraction of stock j that is owned by fund i), and owni,t−1 =
∑
j(ωi,j,t−1 ∗ owni,j,t−1) is the portfolio
weighted average ownership share; liqcostj,t−1 = cBMAj,t−1 is the effective bid-ask spread for stock j,
and liqcosti,t−1 =
∑
j(ωi,j,t−1 ∗ liqcostj,t−1) is the portfolio weighted average bid-ask spread.9
I use two variables, owni,j,t−1 and liqcostj,t−1, to capture the total cost of scaling in the analysis;
the former measures the size of flow-induced trading and the latter the marginal liquidity cost.
Besides the size of scaling, owni,j,t−1 also captures the effect of other size-related constraints; for
example, mutual funds are usually reluctant to hold more than 5% of the shares outstanding in a
stock, in order to avoid mandatory filings with the SEC. I also include owni,t−1 and liqcosti,t−1,
the portfolio-weighted average ownership share and liquidity costs respectively, in the regression to
measure the degree of partial scaling at the portfolio level. Since such portfolio-level partial scaling
is only possible for mutual funds getting new investment but not for those losing investment, I
conduct two separate regressions on the sub-samples with positive and negative quarterly flows.
Moreover, to deal with the heteroscedasticity issue, I conduct a weighted OLS regression. The
problem stems from the fact that the residual term in the regression (i.e., information-motivated
trading) varies in magnitude across funds and over time. Imagine that a manager that receives a
signal s about a stock updates his position in the stock by x% of the fund’s TNA. For the purpose
9I also try a number of alternative specifications; for example, the portfolio weights adjusted for returns in quarter
t, the gross trading volume in the preceding year instead of shares outstanding in the denominator of owni,j,t−1. The
results are by and large unchanged.
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of illustration, let’s make the following simplifying assumptions: a) xi = fi(s) for each manager
differs only by a constant multiplier λi (i.e., fi(·) = λi ∗ g(·)) and b) managers roughly keep the
number of holdings in their portfolios constant over time. In this case, the standard error of the
residual term, or the magnitude of information-driven trading, is proportional to the reciprocal
of the number of holdings in a manager’s portfolio. Hence the weight for each observation in the
regression is set to #holdingsi,t−1 ∗ wi,j,t−1.10
If managers on average perfectly scale their existing positions in response to capital flows, as
we would expect in a frictionless market, β1 should be equal to one and all other coefficients be
zero. This benchmark case is certainly an over-simplification. In the real equity market, we expect
the estimate of β1 to be smaller than one and the estimates of β3, β5, β7, and β9 to be negative to
reflect managers’ increasing tendencies to deviate from perfect scaling as trading costs rise.
The empirical results, presented in Table II (Panel A), are consistent with our predictions.
Columns 1 to 5 correspond to the sample with outflows. On average, managers nearly perfectly
scale down their holdings in response to outflows; for every 1% of redemptions, managers shrink
their existing positions by 0.97%, while absorbing the remaining 0.03% with their cash reserves
and/or non-equity holdings. Between the two measures of scaling costs, the ownership share (i.e.,
sharesi,j,t−1
shroutj,t−1 ) has no effect on the degree of partial scaling down both at the holding level and the
portfolio level.11 The marginal liquidity cost measured by the effective bid-ask spread cBMA, has
a significant and negative effect on partial scaling, but only with marginal statistical significance.
I also include the squared terms of the flow and the ownership share in the analysis to capture
potential nonlinear effects in the regression, but neither shows up significantly.
The results for the inflow sample, presented in Columns 6 to 10, exhibit two notable differences
from the outflow sample. First, managers on average invest only 62% of their new capital in the
existing holdings, and leave the remaining 38% either for new positions or as cash. Second, both
the portfolio-average ownership share and the portfolio-average liquidity cost are significantly and
negatively related to the degree of partial scaling up.
10wi,j,t−1 is used to adjust information-driven trading to the the same numeraire as the dependent variable,
∆shares, which is calculated as a percentage of the shares held as of the last quarter.
11When both the position-level and the portfolio-average ownership share are included in the regression (Column
5), β3 is significantly negative and β7 is significantly positive. This is likely due to the multi-collinearity problem; the
correlation between the two variables is 0.83 in the outflow sample.
11
For the purpose of robustness checks, I conduct a similar regression at the fund-quarter level:
∆sharesi,t =γ0 + γ1 percflowi,t + γ2 owni,t−1 + γ3 percflowi,t ∗ owni,t−1+
γ4 liqcosti,t−1 + γ5 percflowi,t ∗ liqcosti,t−1, (3)
where ∆sharesi,t =
∑
j(∆sharesi,j,t ∗ ωi,j,t−1). The results, presented in Panel B, are largely
consistent with those reported in Panel A. Managers perfectly scale down their positions in response
to redemptions, and partially scale up with new investment; moreover, the degree of partial scaling
up is determined by the portfolio-average ownership share and marginal liquidity cost.
3.2 FIPP
Based on the partial scaling results from the prior section, I define flow-induced trading in each
stock by each mutual fund as:
FITi,j,t = sharesi,j,t−1 ∗ (percflowi,t ∗ PSFi,t−1), (4)
where PSFi,t−1 is the partial scaling factor of fund i at the end of quarter t-1, defined as PSF
inflow
i,t−1 =
0.86− 21.34 ∗ owni,t−1 − 51.08 ∗ liqcosti,t−1, and PSF outflowi,t−1 = 0.97.12
For each stock, I then compute its flow-induced price pressure (FIPP ) in each quarter as the
cumulative flow-induced trading by all mutual funds, divided by the aggregate number of shares
held by mutual funds at the end of the previous quarter. Ideally, the denominator in FIPP
should capture the amount of active liquidity provision in the market, so that the ratio reflects the
resulting short-term price impact. However, there is so far no clear evidence as to which variable
best captures liquidity provision. The choice of total shares held by mutual funds is motivated by
the empirical observations that mutual fund managers have a strong preference for liquidity stocks
(e.g., Gompers and Metrick (2001)) and that they act as active liquidity providers (e.g., Da, Gao,
12This definitions is based on the regression coefficients in Columns 1 and 8 of Table II. I also use the estimates
from Column 4 and 9 to calculate PSF . The results are qualitatively the same. For robustness, I also implement a
rolling-window regression using observations up to t-1 to estimate PSF for the period t, the results are again similar.
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One way to think about this measure is that, if we think of the entire mutual fund industry as one
mutual fund, FIPP captures the magnitude of flow-induced trading of this aggregate fund in each
quarter.13
Table III presents the monthly returns of the calendar-time portfolios constructed from FIPP .
At the end of each quarter, I sort all stocks based on FIPP into deciles and hold the decile
portfolios for the following twelve quarters. Panel A reports the magnitude of FIPP in each
decile from one year before the portfolio ranking to one year after. In the ranking quarter (i.e.,
quarter 0), the stocks in the top decile experience significant flow-induced purchases; mutual funds
in aggregate increase their holdings in these stocks by 17% due to investment inflows. Stocks in
the bottom decile experience substantial flow-induced sales; the difference in FIPP between the
top and bottom deciles is about 22%. FIPP also exhibits significant persistence. The measure is
monotonically increasing from decile 1 to 10 in each of the eight quarters surrounding the ranking
quarter, and the difference in FIPP between deciles 10 and 1 is statistically significant in all eight
quarters. The strong persistence in FIPP is consistent with the finding that investment flows to
mutual funds are highly persistent for more than four quarters. It is also worth noting that due
to the large amount of aggregate capital inflows to the mutual fund industry in the sample period,
the average FIPP (across all deciles) in each quarter is positive.
The portfolio return results (equal-weighted returns in Panel B and value-weighted returns in
Panel C) provide strong support for the flow-induced price pressure hypothesis. The equal-weighted
return difference between the top and bottom deciles ranked by FIPP is 5.19% in the ranking
quarter (5.73% three-factor adjusted, 4.50% four-factor). While the spread is indistinguishable
from zero in the year following portfolio formation, it is significantly negative thereafter, reaching a
total of -7.20% (-5.52% on a three-factor adjusted basis) in years two and three.14 Consistent with
the empirical regularity that mutual funds are more likely to invest in large-cap stocks, the value-
13I also use alternative definitions of FIPP based on, for example, the number of shares outstanding and the total
trading volume in the previous year. The results are qualitatively the same.
14As shown later in the paper, the flow-induced return effect is closely related to stock price momentum; therefore
the Carhart four-factor model is an inappropriate adjustment to detect a return reversal pattern.
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weighted results are stronger than the equal-weighted ones. The value-weighted return difference
between the top and bottom deciles ranked by FIPP is 6.36% in the ranking quarter (6.93% three-
factor adjusted, 5.28% four-factor), and is -11.04% (-10.08% on a three-factor adjusted basis) in
years two and three. These results indicate that the positive returns obtain by the hedge portfolio
in the formation quarter are completely reversed at the end of year three, in support of the price
pressure hypothesis.
A puzzling observation in Table III is that the reversal caused by flow-induced price pressure
emerges one year after portfolio formation. This result seems to be at odds with Coval and Stafford
(2007) which documents a significant reversal pattern immediately after the ranking quarter. The
difference is mainly caused by the relative strength of two countervailing forces associated with
FIPP . On the one hand, flow-induced trading in a quarter drives stock prices away from their
fundamental values, demanding an immediate reversal in the subsequent quarters. On the other
hand, since FIPP is highly persistent (Panel A), stocks that undergo flow-induced purchases (sales)
in the current quarter are likely to experience more flow-induced purchases (sales) subsequently.
Taken together, the two forces work against each other and the net effect is insignificant in my
sample. In contrast, the reversal effect dominates in the extreme-flow sample analyzed in Coval
and Stafford (2007), for two reasons. First, extreme investment flows cause larger demand shocks
in individual stocks, and hence lead to a stronger reversal. Second, extreme capital flows are less
likely to repeat themselves, and therefore current extreme-flow-induced trading is a poor predictor
of future flow-induced trading. As a result, Coval and Stafford (2007) find a reversal pattern
immediately following portfolio ranking in their analysis.
3.3 Expected FIPP
Given that mutual fund flow-induced trading can generate significant price pressure in individual
stocks and that investment flows to mutual funds are largely predictable, one may wonder whether
this flow-based mechanism can lead to stock return predictability. The seemingly apparent link
between predictable demand shocks and predictable stock returns is not theoretically obvious. The
standard arbitrage argument maintains that arbitrageurs, anticipating that mutual funds will have
to buy or sell due to capital inflows or outflows in the next period, would buy or sell in the current
period to front run mutual funds. In doing so, arbitrageurs effectively eliminate stock return
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predictability by incorporating the predictable part of future demand shocks into stock returns
today. However, due to the risk involved in this arbitrage strategy – specifically, realized flows and
thereby flow-induced trading are uncertain – arbitrageurs pursue this strategy to a less extent than
it is required to completely eliminate return predictability. This way, a part of the stock return
predictability remains in the data, and arbitrageurs are (fairly) compensated for bearing the risk
involved in their arbitrage activities.
3.3.1 Expected Mutual Fund Flows
To test the possibility that the flow-based mechanism can cause predictable stock returns, I first
replicate the flow-performance relation that has been extensively studied in the prior literature
(e.g., Ippolito (1992); Gruber (1996); Chevalier and Ellison (1997); Sirri and Tufano (1998)):
percflowi,t =β0 + β1 alphai,t−4:t−1 + β2 adjreti,t−4:t−1 + β3 log(TNAi,t−1)+
β4 alphai,t−4:t−1 ∗ log(TNAi,t−1) + β5 percflowi,t−1+ (6)
β6 percflowi,t−2 + β7 percflowi,t−3 + β8 percflowi,t−4,
where alphai,t−4:t−1 and adjreti,t−4:t−1 are the four-factor fund alpha and the market-adjusted fund
return in the prior year, respectively. I also include four lags of quarterly flows in the regression to
control for the persistence in investment flows.
The first four columns of Table IV report the coefficient estimates using the Fama and MacBeth
(1973) approach and the next four columns the estimates from pooled OLS regressions. Consistent
with prior findings, all coefficients appear statistically and economically significant. Most notably,
fund alpha, in excess of the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, appears to be an important determi-
nant of future investment flows; this is true even after controlling for market-adjusted fund returns
in the analysis. In a univariate regression, a 1% increase in the four-factor fund alpha leads to a
more than 4.8% increase in investment flows in the subsequent quarter. This may seem surprising
at first as retail investors unlikely use factor models to evaluate mutual fund performance, but as
suggested by anecdotal evidence, many retail investors rely on benchmark-adjusted returns to guide
their investment decisions, which in essence is a way to control for systematic risk.
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3.3.2 Scaling in Response to Anticipated Flow
If flows can be forecasted by an econometrician, flows can also be forecasted by mutual fund
managers, perhaps with a greater precision. If mutual fund managers in anticipation of future flows
adjust their holdings in advance, expected investment flows may not lead to demand shocks in the
future as they are already incorporated in today’s holdings. This preemptive mechanism, however,
is unlikely to be the case. First, as most mutual funds do not buy stocks on margin, managers
cannot invest with anticipated inflows. Second, with moderate expected outflows, managers may
have little incentive to engage in preemptive selling as they probably want to preserve cash for
extreme outflow scenarios, when the costs of liquidity are the dearest. Finally, in anticipation of
extreme future outflows, even if managers are eager to dump their holdings in order to build a cash
buffer, there is probably not much they can do, as the funds are likely already facing large outflows.
I conduct a formal test of the preemptive mechanism by including expected flows computed
from lagged fund alpha (in place of actual flows) in the partial scaling regression (3). If managers
on average anticipate future flows and take preemptive actions, we expect the coefficient of expected
flows to be significantly smaller than that of realized flows. The results, shown in Columns 4 and
8 in Panel B of Table II, indicate otherwise; the coefficient estimates for anticipated outflows and
inflows are almost identical to those in Columns 1 and 5, suggesting that managers do not scale
their portfolios in anticipation of flows.
3.3.3 The Return Pattern of Expected FIPP
Expected flow-induced price pressure (or E[FIPP ]) is defined almost identically as FIPP , except
that expected investment flows are now used in place of actual flows. Specifically, E[FIPP ] for






where E[FITi,j,t] = sharesi,j,t−1 ∗ (E[percflowi,t|alphai,t−1]∗PSFi,t−1). I further define a measure
of the expected flow-induced price pressure for each mutual fund i in quarter t as the portfolio
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(E[FIPPj,t] ∗ ωi,j,t−1). (8)
Note that past fund flows are excluded in the estimation of expected future flows. This is because, as
shown in Table III, past flow-induced price pressure does not predict stock returns in the following
quarter/year, due to the two countervailing effects discussed before.
To test the return predictability of expected FIPP , at the end of each quarter, I sort all stocks
into deciles based on E[FIPP ] and hold the equal-weighted portfolios for twelve quarters.15 As
shown in Panel A of Table V, the return difference between the top and the bottom deciles is
2.52% (2.79% three-factor adjusted, 1.59% four-factor adjusted) in the quarter following portfolio
formation and 5.28% (6.96% three-factor adjusted, 4.44% four-factor adjusted) in the following
year. While the return spread is indistinguishable from zero in quarter five, it becomes significantly
negative after quarter six, reaching a total of -5.67% (-5.67% on a three-factor adjusted basis) from
quarters six to twelve. In other words, the initial gains in the first year are (almost) completely
revered in the subsequent two years, consistent with a story of predictable price pressure.16
I also conduct a similar sort on mutual funds by E[FIPP ∗]. As shown in Panel B of Table V,
the difference in fund returns between the top and bottom deciles ranked by E[FIPP ∗] is 1.65%
(2.13 three-factor adjusted, 1.23% four-factor adjusted) and 4.80% (6.60% three-factor adjusted,
4.44% four-factor adjusted) in the quarter and year following portfolio formation, respectively. The
return spread turns significantly negative in quarters six through twelve, reaching -4.62% (-5.25%
on a three-factor adjusted basis) in total over this period. One potential implication of the return
pattern is that mutual fund managers are unable to foresee the return reversal and to unload their
positions before the reversal starts. In addition, the return reversal in the third year is weaker than
that in the second year, in terms of magnitude. This is consistent with the fact that on average
mutual funds turn over their positions once every one and a half years; in other words, managers
have already unloaded most of the holdings they accumulated at the beginning of the holding period
15The value-weighted returns are similar.
16The expected price pressure effect documented here is distinct from the style effect identified in the previous
literature (e.g., Teo and Woo (2004)). The fund performance measure used in here is the abnormal fund return after
controlling for the size and value factors.
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by the end of the second year.
To sum up, the results presented in this section suggest that mutual fund flow-induced trading
can have significant return effects both at the stock level and at the fund level. In addition, since
investment flows to mutual funds are predictable, the flow-driven return effect is also predictable.
In the remainder of this paper, I will explore the implications of the flow-based mechanism for prior
studies on mutual fund performance predictability and stock return predictability.
4 Mutual Fund Performance Predictability
At the end of 2006, equity mutual funds owned over 30% of the US equity market and collected
over $20 billion in annual fees and expenses.17 It is therefore of enormous importance both for
investors and researchers to understand whether professional portfolio management adds value and
if so, how to identify managers with superior skills. While the existing literature finds little support
for overall superior performance by mutual funds in terms of net returns, there is ample evidence
of heterogeneity in managerial ability.18 Most notably, the prior literature documents that mutual
fund performance is persistent – i.e., funds with stronger prior performance continue outperforming
their peers in the subsequent periods, and that money is smart – i.e., money flows mutual funds
that underperform subsequently to those that outperform. The conventional interpretations of
these findings are that some managers are more skilled than others and that retail investors are
able to identify managers with superior skills.
4.1 Mutual Fund Performance Persistence
A large body of research has been dedicated to detecting the persistence in mutual fund perfor-
mance. Grinblatt and Titman (1992), Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1994), and Brown and Goetzmann
(1995) are among the first to document significant persistence in the (abnormal) performance rank-
ings among mutual funds. Using a calendar-time portfolio approach, Hendricks, Patel, and Zeck-
hauser (1993) report that mutual funds in the top return octile outperform those in the bottom
octile by about 8% (risk adjusted) in the following year. Carhart (1997) reduces the return spread
17See, for example, French (2008). Fees and expenses are computed from the CRSP mutual fund dataset.
18For example, Coval and Moskowitz (2001), Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005), and Cremers and Petajisto
(2007) find that mutual funds with a stronger local bias, a higher industry concentration, and larger Active Share
tend to have better performance.
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to about 4% a year (still statistically significant) after controlling for stock price momentum as
an additional risk factor.19 More recently, Bollen and Busse (2005) and Cohen, Coval, and Pastor
(2005) report stronger performance predictability by using daily mutual fund performance data
and a refined measure of fund alpha, respectively.
Table VI (Panel A) replicates prior studies on mutual fund performance persistence.20 At the
end of each quarter, I sort all mutual funds into deciles based on the Carhart four-factor alpha
computed from monthly fund returns in the previous year, and hold the equal-weighted portfolios
for the next twelve quarters.21 The spread between the four-factor alpha of the top and bottom
deciles is 1.17% in the subsequent quarter and 4.44% in the subsequent year. This is then followed by
an insignificant reversal in years two and three. Consistent with Cohen, Coval, and Pastor (2005),
I find that more than half of the alpha spread in the post-formation year is due to continued
outperformance by past winning funds.
At the face value, the evidence presented here and in prior studies is consistent with the idea
that there is considerable heterogeneity in manager ability and that realized risk-adjusted fund
performance (reasonably well) captures such heterogeneity. In this section, I offer a new way to
think about the evidence. Specifically, I argue that past winning funds, by collectively scaling
up their existing holdings with investment inflows, effectively drive up their own performance in
the subsequent period; similarly, past losing funds, collectively scaling down their holdings due to
capital outflows, push down their performance.
The key word here is collectively ; the price pressure is unlikely caused by a single mutual fund,
but rather the collective purchases or sales by all mutual funds with similar past performance.
Put it differently, the mutual funds with the best past performance are not necessarily going to
experience the largest upward flow-induced price pressure subsequently; rather, it is the mutual
funds whose stocks are also widely held by other winning funds that will enjoy the largest upward
price pressure from investment flows. This unique feature of the flow-based mechanism enables me
19It is worth pointing out that there are two sets of results in Carhart (1997), although the author focuses on one
of them. When the unadjusted fund returns are used to rank mutual funds, the return spread between the top and
bottom deciles in the post-formation period is insignificant after controlling for stock price momentum; however, if
the four-factor adjusted fund alpha is used in the ranking procedure, the resulting return spread in the post-formation
period is about 4% (statistically significant) even with the control of price momentum.
20The procedure used here is very similar to the one used in Carhart (1997), except that Carhart rebalances the
portfolios once a year only at the end of December.
21I also compute fund alpha based on the returns in the prior three years and the results are qualitatively the same.
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to differentiate the price pressure hypothesis from the ability story, because the latter predicts that
a mutual fund’s past performance is a good predictor of its own future performance.
To empirically distinguish between the two hypotheses, I conduct two sequential sorts.22 In
the first sequential sort, I rank mutual funds first by E[FIPP ∗] and then by fund alpha, and hold
the resulting portfolios for one quarter. If fund alpha indeed captures ex-ante manager ability,
it is expected to remain a significant predictor of future fund performance after controlling for
E[FIPP ∗]. On the other hand, if fund alpha predicts future fund performance only because it
predicts future flow-induced price pressure, it should be subsumed by E[FIPP ∗], as the latter
more accurately captures such price pressure. Panel B of Table VI reports the equal-weighted
returns of the 25 portfolios. After controlling for E[FIPP ∗], the return spread between the top
and bottom quintiles ranked by alpha ranges from -0.42% to 0.63% and is insignificant in four out
of the five E[FIPP ∗] quintiles. The average spread is also insignificant: 0.15% on a three-factor
adjusted basis and 0.21% on a four-factor adjusted basis.
To test whether E[FIPP ∗] contains information about future fund performance that is not
included in alpha, I conduct a second sequential sort in the reverse order, first by fund alpha and
then by E[FIPP ∗]. As shown in Panel C, E[FIPP ∗] remains significant in predicting future fund
performance after controlling for fund alpha. The spread between the abnormal returns of the
top and bottom quintiles ranked by E[FIPP ∗] ranges from 0.42% to 1.80% and is significant in
most of the fund alpha quintiles. The average spreads, 1.23% (on a three-factor adjusted basis)
and 0.78% (on a four-factor adjusted basis), are both economically and statistically significant.
Taken together, the results of the two conditional sorts suggest that the evidence of mutual fund
performance persistence is largely driven by predictable flow-induced price pressure.
4.2 The Smart Money Effect
If there is heterogeneity in ability among mutual fund managers, a related question is whether retail
investors are able to identify managers with superior skills. This is an important question given the
enormous amount of capital flows across mutual funds. If capital is not directed from less skilled
to more skilled fund managers, it raises some serious doubt about investor rationality and market
22Instead of performing an independent sort by E[FIPP ∗] and fund alpha, I conduct two sequential sorts. This is
due to the high correlation (≈ 0.55) between the two variables.
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efficiency. Gruber (1996) proposes an intuitive test to settle this debate: if retail investors are
smart, or put it differently, if money is smart (hence the name the “smart money” effect), then past
investment flows should positively predict future fund performance. A number of follow-up studies
(see, e.g., Zheng (1999); Frazzini and Lamont (2008); Keswani and Stolin (2008)) find supportive
evidence for this prediction, yet with the qualification that such performance predictability is
confined to the first quarter after portfolio ranking.
I replicate the prior studies on the smart money effect and report the results in Table VII (Panel
A). At the end of each quarter, I sort all mutual funds into deciles based on their quarterly flows
and hold the equal-weighted portfolios for the next twelve quarters. Consistent with prior studies,
the return difference between the top and bottom deciles ranked by flows is 0.51% (0.84% on a
three-factor adjusted basis) in the following quarter, statistically significant at the 10% (1%) level.
The total spread at the end of the first year, however, is indistinguishable from zero, indicating
some reversal in quarters two to four. The spread then becomes significantly negative in years two
and three, reaching a total of -3.12% (-3.12% on a three-factor adjusted basis). This fund return
pattern suggests that on average retail investors are losing money over the long run by flipping
their mutual fund investment – inconsistent with the predictions of the smart money effect.
Nevertheless, the initial positive spread we see in the first quarter after portfolio formation is
largely consistent with the idea that retail investors are able to identify superior manager skills –
perhaps only in the very short run. In this section, I provide an alternative explanation for this
evidence. Specifically, mutual funds with current inflows receive more investment subsequently,
collectively scale up their existing holdings, and effectively drive up their subsequent performance,
and the opposite is true for funds that are currently losing capital.
To test whether the mutual fund flow-based mechanism is responsible for the smart money
effect, I independently sort mutual funds by both E[FIPP ∗] and fund flows, and hold the resulting
portfolios for one quarter (Panel B). If past flows predict future fund performance only because
they predict future flow-induced price pressure, past flows should be subsumed by E[FIPP ∗] in the
horse race, since the latter is a more accurate measure of such price pressure. After controlling for
E[FIPP ∗], lagged flows no long predict future fund performance. The return spread between the
top and bottom quintiles ranked by quarterly flows ranges from -0.03% to 0.48% in the following
quarter and is insignificant in four out of the five E[FIPP ∗] quintiles; the average spread is 0.09%
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(0.21% on a three-factor adjusted basis), statistically insignificant at any conventional level. On
the other hand, E[FIPP ∗] remains statistically significant in predicting future fund performance.
In sum, the portfolio return results in the double sort, and the long-term reversal pattern in the
uni-variate sort by quarterly flows alone, suggest that the evidence of the smart money effect is
more consistent with the flow-induced price pressure hypothesis.
What may seem puzzling at first is that while the aggregate capital flows to a stock in quarter
t do not predict the stock return in quarter t+1 (Table III Panel B and C), the investment flows to
a mutual fund in quarter t strongly predict the fund return in quarter t+1. The key to solve this
puzzle is to understand an important difference between the investment flows to a mutual fund and
the flows to a stock: the amount of flow-induced trading in a stock is determined by the investment
flows to all the mutual funds that are holding the stock. Put it differently, the mutual funds with
the largest investment inflows (outflows) are not necessarily holding the stocks with the largest
flow-induced purchases (sales).
4.3 A Regression Analysis
As a complement to the calendar-time portfolio approach, I conduct a multivariate regression
analysis on the predictability of mutual fund performance. In doing so, I can better isolate the
effect of each of the three variables (E[FIPP ], fund alpha, and fund flows), while controlling for
other fund characteristics that are known to predict future fund performance. Formally, I conduct
the following regression analysis with quarterly mutual fund observations:
reti,t+1 =β0 + β1 E[FIPP ∗i,t] + β2 alphai,t + β3 log(flowi,t) + β4 expensesi,t+
β5 log(agei,t) + β6 log(no stocksi,t) + β7 log(TNAi,t) + β8 log(turnoveri,t), (9)
where the dependent variable is the mutual fund return in quarter t+1; E[FIPP ∗] is the portfolio
weighted average expected flow-induced price pressure for fund i computed based on fund returns
in the previous year, and alpha is the Carhart four-factor alpha computed based on monthly fund
returns in the previous year; flow is the percentage investment flow in quarter t; expenses is the
expense ratio, age is the number of years since fund inception, and no stocks is the number of
stocks held in the portfolio at the end of quarter t; and finally, turnover is the portfolio turnover
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in quarter t. The coefficients are estimated using the Fama and MacBeth (1973) approach and the
standard errors are Newey-West corrected with four lags.
The results, shown in Table VIII, are consistent with the calendar-time portfolio analysis.
E[FIPP ∗] is a significant predictor of subsequent fund performance in all regression specifica-
tions. Past fund alpha and past fund flows significantly and positively predict future fund perfor-
mance when included in the regression alone, but their predictive power is completely subsumed
by E[FIPP ∗], once E[FIPP ∗] is added to the regression. The coefficients on other fund charac-
teristics are in line with the findings in the prior literature: smaller funds, funds that hold a larger
number of stocks and turn over their portfolios faster tend to have better subsequent performance.
In sum, the results from the multivariate regression analysis lend further support to the hypothesis
that both mutual fund performance persistence and the smart money effect are manifestations of
the predictable price pressure induced by mutual fund flows.
5 Stock Price Momentum
Stock price momentum is one of the most robust and puzzling anomalies in the asset pricing
literature. It has been replicated and confirmed in almost all asset classes, all countries, and all time
periods.23 What makes the price momentum effect particularly interesting to academic research is
that a) unlike most other anomalies, the price momentum effect is also significant among large-cap
stocks, and b) the momentum strategies have stayed profitable for more than two decades (e.g.,
Fama and French (2008)). Given the robustness and persistence of the anomaly, it is important to
understand its causes; yet despite a large body of theoretical works on price momentum, there is
little empirical evidence as to its underlying drivers.24 This section tests an additional mechanism
that can potentially contribute to our understanding of the stock price momentum effect. In
particular, I argue that winning funds, by scaling up their existing holdings that are concentrated
in past winning stocks, drive up the returns of past winning stocks; and similarly, losing funds, by
scaling down their existing holdings, drive down the returns of past losing stocks.25
23See, for example, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993); Rouwenhorst (1998); Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999); Jegadeesh
and Titman (2001).
24See, for example, Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998); Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998); Hong
and Stein (1999); Grinblatt and Han (2005).
25In an independent work, Vayanos and Woolley (2008) formalize this intuition in a rational framework.
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To examine the extent to which the flow-based mechanism is responsible for the price momentum
effect, I conduct a Fama and MacBeth (1973) return regression with both cumulative past stock
returns and E[FIPP ] on the right hand side. Since the prior literature on stock price momentum
focuses on gross stock returns, I use a slightly different definition of expected flow-induced price
pressure, in which expected investment flows are estimated from the market-adjusted fund returns
rather than the four-factor fund alpha. In addition, as mutual funds report their holdings once every
quarter, I conduct the cross-sectional regression on a quarterly basis. Since the price momentum
effect is stronger with a holding period of three months than one month (e.g., Jegadeesh and
Titman (1993)), using quarterly stock returns as the dependent variable does not bias against the
momentum effect. Finally, I require a stock to be held by at least three mutual funds at the end
of the previous quarter to be included in the sample. The cross-sectional regression is specified as
follows:
retj,t+1:t+3 =β0 + β1 E[FIPPj,t−k+1:t] + β2 retj,t + β3 retj,t−k:t−1 + β4 retj,t−36:t−k−1+
β5 bmj,t + β6 log(mktcapj,t) + β7 turnoverj,t−11:t. (10)
The dependent variable is the cumulative stock return in the next quarter. The right-hand side
variables include the expected flow-induced price pressure E[FIPP ] calculated from the market-
adjusted fund returns in the prior k months, cumulative past stock returns measured at various
horizons, and control variables that have been shown to predict future stock returns. rett−k:t−1,
the cumulative stock return in months t-k to t-1, captures the price momentum effect.26 bm
and mktcap are the book-to-market ratio and the market capitalization at the end of month t,
respectively. turnover is the average monthly share turnover in the previous year. If mutual fund
flow-induced trading is partially responsible for the stock price momentum effect, we expect the
coefficient of rett−k:t−1 to drop significantly after controlling for E[FIPP ] in the regression.
The results, presented in Table IX (Panel A), indicate that while the flow-based mechanism
is distinct from the price momentum effect, it is an important source of the momentum profits.
In the period of 1980-2006, after controlling for E[FIPP ], the predictive power of rett−k:t−1 on
future stock returns drops by 25%, 31%, and 42% when k is equal to 12, 6, and 3, respectively.
26I skip a month between the formation and holding periods to address the short-term stock return reversal effect.
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The drops in coefficients for both k equal to 6 and 3 are statistically significant at the 5% level
(t=2.34 and 2.18, respectively).27 It is evident from the regression results that E[FIPP ] accounts
for a larger portion of the momentum effect when both E[FIPP ] and rett−k:t−1 are measured at
a shorter horizon. One possibility for this pattern is that, since mutual funds are continuously
updating their positions, the shorter the formation period is, the more representative the end-of-
period holdings are of the average holdings in the formation period, the latter of which determine
the fund performance in the ranking period.
Moreover, as suggested by prior literature (e.g., Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 2001)), the price
momentum effect exhibits a strong seasonal pattern – momentum returns are significantly positive
from February to December but are significantly negative in January. To address the seasonality
in price momentum, I conduct the same regression analysis on a monthly frequency (with k=6)
and report two sets of coefficient estimates (Columns 9 to 12 of Panel A), one for the month of
January and the other for the remainder of the year. Interestingly, the January reversal effect of
the momentum strategy is quite weak in my sample, potentially due to the fact that mutual funds
tend to hold larger stocks. The momentum effect in February – December is partially explained
by E[FIPP ]. The coefficient on rett−k:t−1 decreases by about 35% (t=2.02) after controlling for
E[FIPP ].
Panel B reports additional tests that exploit time-series and cross-sectional variations in mutual
fund ownership in stocks. Given the substantial increase in the presence of mutual funds in the
stock market (see Table I) over the past three decades, we expect the flow-based mechanism to
account for a larger part of the momentum effect in the second half of the sample than in the
first half. Similarly, since mutual fund holdings are more concentrated in large-cap stocks, and
in addition other explanations for stock price momentum (e.g., underreaction to information and
implementation costs) are less suited for large-cap stocks, flow-induced price pressure should explain
more of the momentum effect among large-cap than among small-cap stocks. Both predictions are
corroborated by the data. The first four columns report the coefficient estimates for the first and
the second half of the sample period. E[FIPP ] accounts for more than 39% (t=2.12) of stock
price momentum in the post-1993 period, compared to only 16% in the pre-1993 period. The
27The standard errors are estimated from the time-series of coefficients.
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next four columns present the coefficient estimates for small-cap and large-cap stocks.28 While the
flow-based mechanism accounts for close to 50% (t=2.46) of the momentum effect and renders past
stock returns insignificant in the regression among large-cap stocks, it explains less than 20% of
the effect among small-cap stocks.
The key takeaways from table IX are threefold. First, while the flow-based mechanism is an
important driver of the stock price momentum effect, it is by no means the only one; therefore the
mechanism should be viewed as a complement to rather than a substitute of the existing theories.
Second, this mechanism is substantially more powerful to explain stock price momentum in more
recent years and among large-cap stock; in a way, this mechanism explains the main puzzle of the
price momentum effect – its persistence and robustness. Finally, although the analysis in table IX
focuses exclusively on the investment flows to mutual funds, the same mechanism can be easily
generalized to other types of institutional money managers, such as investment clubs, hedge funds,
and pension funds, and it is reasonable to think that the generalized flow-based mechanism can
account for an even larger portion of the stock price momentum effect.
6 Robustness Checks
6.1 An Alternative Hypothesis
In a recent paper, Cohen, Coval, and Pastor (2005) propose a two-step measure of manager ability
that aggregates past fund alpha across managers with similar holdings. Specifically, the authors
first calculate a measure of stock “quality,” defined as the average past four-factor fund alpha across




i alphai,t−1 ∗ ωi,j,t−1∑
i ωi,j,t−1
. (11)
28In each quarter, a stock is classified as a large-cap stock if its market-cap is above the medium market-cap of
NYSE stocks at the end of the prior quarter, and a small-cap stock otherwise.
29Wermers, Yao, and Zhao (2007) construct a similar stock quality measure.
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In the second step, the authors construct a measure of manager ability by aggregating the expected




Γj,t ∗ ωi,j,t−1. (12)
The intuition is that stocks held primarily by skilled managers, as measured by past four-factor
alpha, should have higher “quality” or expected returns than those held primarily by unskilled
managers; by the same token, managers that are holding stocks with higher “quality” must be
more skilled than those holding stocks with lower “quality.” The authors argue that this refined
measure of manager ability is superior to the traditional measure of fund alpha, because, if the
alpha is a noisy measure of a manager’s true ability, then “pooling information across managers
adds precision.” This reduced-error hypothesis seems to bear out in the data; Γ∗ subsumes past
four-factor fund alpha in predicting future fund performance.
Some simple algebra shows that the stock quality measure Γ is closely related to the expected
flow-induce price pressure variable introduced in this paper:
E[FIPPj,t] =
∑




iE[percflowi,t] ∗ ωi,j,t−1 ∗ TNAi,t−1 ∗ PSFi,t−1∑
i ωi,j,t−1 ∗ TNAi,t−1
. (13)
A comparison of Equation (13) to Equation (11) reveals that the only difference between Γ and
E[FIPP ] is whether to include the fund size and the partial scaling factor in the formula. Empiri-
cally, the two variables have a positive correlation close to 0.85. Therefore, we can not distinguish
between the reduced-error and the flow-induced price pressure hypotheses simply by running a
horse race between Γ and E[FIPP ], due to the potentially severe multi-collinearity problem.
6.1.1 A Return Reversal Pattern
The key distinction between the reduced-error and price pressure hypotheses lies in their different
predictions about long-term stock and fund returns. While the former maintains that the abnormal
stock/fund returns of the hedging portfolio are a permanent price effect, the latter predicts a
complete return reversal over the long run. In untabulated results, I show that the stock return
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pattern associated with Γ is almost identical to the one in Table III (Panel B): the positive return
earned by the hedging portfolio in the first year is completely reversed at the end of year three.
Similarly, sorting mutual funds into deciles based on Γ∗, I find that the positive return spread in
the first year between “skilled” and “unskilled” managers are almost completely reversed in years
two and three.
6.1.2 Comovement
The two hypotheses also differ importantly in their predictions about stock return comovement.
The reduced-error hypothesis predicts that stocks held by “skilled” (“unskilled”) managers have
high (low) expected future returns, but says nothing about the stock return comovement pattern.
On the other hand, the price pressure story predicts that stocks held by mutual funds expected
to get inflows (or outflows) are going to exhibit comovement in returns, as the daily fluctuations
in investment flows can introduce a common variation in stock returns. Moreover, if investors
withdraw from some mutual funds in order to invest in others (e.g., Barberis and Shleifer (2003)),
we should see a negative return correlation between stocks with expected inflow-induced purchases
and those with expected outflow-induced sales.
To test the comovement pattern in stock returns, at the end of each quarter, I sort all stocks
into quintiles based on Γ and conduct the following time-series regression using daily or weekly
returns in the following year:
rj,t = β0 + β1 rgrp,t + β2 ropp,t + β3 rffind,t + β4 rmktrf,t + β5 rsmb,t + β6 rhml,t + β7 rumd,t, (14)
where rgrp,t is the return of the quintile portfolio to which stock j belongs, rffind,t is the return of
the industry portfolio based on the Fama and French (1997) 48-industry definition, rmktrf,t, rsmb,t,
rhml,t, and rumd,t are the market, size, value, and momentum factors, respectively. For stocks in
the top and bottom quintiles, I also include ropp,t in the regression, which is the return of the
opposite quintile portfolio. All portfolio returns are computed on a value-weighted basis, and for
rgrp,t and rffind,t, I exclude the stock being analyzed from the calculation. After obtaining one set
of regression coefficients for each stock at the end of each quarter, I take the cross-sectional averages
of the coefficients in each quarter. I then report the time-series averages of the coefficient estimates
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and their t-statistics based on standard errors with Newey-West corrections of up to four lags. If
Γ indeed captures some unobserved manager ability, we expect an insignificant return comovement
pattern among stocks within each quintile beyond what is captured by common risk factors, or in
other words, β1 to be indistinguishable from zero.
The regression results, shown in Table X, are consistent with the price pressure hypothesis.
Panel A reports the coefficient estimates computed based on weekly stock returns. β1 is significantly
positive in all five Γ quintiles, suggesting considerable comovement within each of the five quintiles
on top of the common risk factors. In addition, the comovement is significantly stronger in the
extreme Γ quintiles than in the middle quintile, consistent with the fact that the flow-induced return
effect is greater in the extreme quintiles. Finally, stock returns in quintiles one and five appear
to be negatively correlated (significant at the 10% level), again in support of the price pressure
hypothesis. Panel B conducts the same analysis based on daily stock returns and the results are
qualitatively the same.
In sum, the results presented in this section – both the return reversal and comovement patterns
– are more consistent with the flow-induced price pressure hypothesis, and less so with an ability
story.
6.2 More Robustness Tests
6.2.1 Pre-1993 vs. Post-1993
As shown in Table I, the aggregate mutual fund ownership in the first half of the sample is less than
one third of that in the second half (3.67% vs. 12.02%). Since the time-series differences in mutual
fund ownership are unlikely to be driven by some endogenous choices made by mutual funds, we
expect E[FIPP ] to have a significantly stronger return predictive power in the second half than
in the first half of the sample. The calendar-time portfolio return results, shown in the first four
columns of Table XI, support this prediction; the spread in the four-factor alpha between the top
and bottom deciles ranked by E[FIPP ] is substantially higher in the post-1993 period than in the
pre-1993 period (2.13% vs. 1.44%), and the difference of 0.70% is statistically significant at the 5%
level (t=2.43).
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6.2.2 First Calendar Quarter vs. the Remaining Quarters
Prior research on mutual fund flows finds that, because a large fraction of retail investors only
rebalance their portfolios at the beginning of a year (e.g., Chevalier and Ellison (1997)), the mag-
nitude of capital flows across mutual funds is much larger in the first calendar quarter than the
other three quarters. Since this difference is unrelated to any confounding factors, such as manager
ability, it provides us with a clean means of identification. If aggregate mutual fund flow-induced
trading affects stock prices, we expect the return predictability of E[FIPP ] to be significantly
stronger in the first calendar quarter. On the other hand, if managerial ability is driving flow-based
return predictability (as argued by Cohen, Coval, and Pastor (2005)), we expect no significant
difference in return predictability in different calendar quarters. The results shown in Columns 4-8
of Table XI support the price pressure hypothesis. The return predictability of E[FIPP ] in the
first calendar quarter is more than twice as large as that in other quarters (3.24% vs. 1.26%), and
the difference of 1.99% is statistically significant at the 5% level (t=2.27). In sum, the subsample
analyses based on time periods and calendar quarters lend further support to the flow-based price
pressure hypothesis.
7 Managerial Ability and Retail Investor Rationality
How do we interpret the findings of this paper that neither mutual fund performance persistence
nor the “smart money” effect survives after we control for the flow-based mechanism of return
predictability? In particular, how do we reconcile the lack of performance persistence with the
findings in prior literature that some managers are able to earn positive abnormal returns?30 There
are two potential explanations for the evidence presented in this study, and the main difference
between them lies in whether retail investors rationally respond to past mutual fund performance.
The first explanation is motivated by the model in Berk and Green (2004), which has the follow-
ing two key ingredients. First, investors correctly infer manager ability from past fund performance
and reward good managers with more investment capital. Second, there are decreasing returns
for managers to deploying capital. In equilibrium, the model predicts that the abnormal returns
30See, for example, Coval and Moskowitz (2001); Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005); Cremers and Petajisto
(2007); Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008).
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expected to be earned by skilled managers are immediately eliminated by competitive capital pro-
vision, and hence there is no performance predictability either in the short-run or in the long-run.
The model’s predictions also rely on two implicit assumptions: a) mutual fund trading does not
have price implications and b) investors can move capital across mutual funds without any con-
straints or costs. In the real market, both assumptions are unlikely to hold perfectly. The mutual
fund herding literature documents significant price impact resulting from mutual funds’ trading in
the same direction; studies on mutual fund flows also find significant persistence in the investment
flows to mutual funds, suggesting that capital movement is constrained at least in the short-run.
Loosening the no price impact and the perfect capital mobility assumptions, we can reconcile the
predictions in Berk and Green (2004) with the stock and mutual fund return patterns observed in
this paper. To be specific, investment capital gradually moves to managers with superior skills, and
eventually eliminates abnormal returns earned by these managers. But in the process, managers
receiving new capital have to scale up their portfolios while managers losing investment have to
scale down; such flow-induced trading drives stock prices temporarily away from the fundamental
values, and gives rise to return patterns that look like performance-persistence and the “smart
money” effect in the short-term.
An alternative interpretation of my findings is that past fund performance is a poor measure
of manager ability, but retail investors, limited by their access to other information sources, rely
excessively on fund past performance to guide their investment decisions. The reason that short-
term fund performance, such as the four-factor fund alpha measured in a year, is a poor measure
of manager ability is twofold. First, short-term mutual fund performance is noisy, and on top of
that the estimation of risk-adjusted fund performance introduces even more noise. Second, fund
alpha may capture factors other than manager ability. Intuitively, if we think about a mutual fund
portfolio as a combination of a passive portfolio that tracks the benchmark index and an active
portfolio that represents the manager’s private information (in the spirit of Berk and Green (2004)),
the total alpha is determined by both the performance and the size of the active portfolio. While
the former arguably reflects manager ability, the latter is partially determined by the manager’s
risk aversion and his self-perception; a less risk-averse or more (over)confident manager tends to
have a larger active portfolio and hence, ceteris paribus, larger alpha. Since both risk aversion and
self-perception can vary over time, one must sort out these confounding factors in order to back
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out manager ability, a difficult task if at all possible.
In addition to performance persistence and the “smart money” effect, the flow-based mechanism
introduced in this paper has broad implications for mutual fund performance evaluation. Specifi-
cally, any variable that can predict future mutual fund flows and flow-induced trading may appear
as an ex-ante measure of manager ability. There are a number of tests we can do to distinguish
the ability story from the price pressure hypothesis. The first and most straightforward test is to
conduct a horse race between the variable that is supposed to capture manager ability and expected
flow-induced price pressure. Second, we can test for a reversal pattern over the long run. Third, we
can analyze the return comovement pattern within each group of stocks sorted by the ability vari-
able. If the variable really captures some unobserved manager ability, we expect a) that it remains
significant in predicting future fund performance after controlling for E[FIPP ], b) a permanent
return effect (i.e., no reversal in the subsequent periods), and c) little return comovement beyond
what is explained by common risk factors.
8 Conclusion
This paper proposes and tests a mechanism through which mutual fund flows can affect individual
stock returns and mutual fund performance. This paper further demonstrates that such a mech-
anism is responsible for mutual fund performance persistence and the smart money effect, and
partially explains stock price momentum. These findings have implications for both asset pricing
theories and mutual fund performance evaluation.
A potential direction for future research is to systematically examine both flow-induced trading
and information-driven trading (i.e., the decomposition in equation (2)). A number of authors
have looked at aggregate mutual fund holding and trading decisions, but have at best found mixed
evidence regarding manager ability (e.g., Chen, Jegadeesh, and Wermers (2000); Wermers (1999,
2000)). Separating flow-induced trading, which has little to do with stock-picking ability but can
cause significant price pressure, from total trading may help us better understand how managers
collect and exploit private information. Earlier studies on this topic include Edelen (1999), who
decomposes total fund turnover into a flow-driven component and an information-driven one. In-
terestingly, Edelen reports that both flow-induced and information-driven trading destroys value.
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More surprisingly, the negative returns associated with flow-induced turnover are entirely driven
by inflows and not by outflows. A decomposition of trading in individual stocks, rather than of
fund turnover, may shed more light on the mutual fund performance analysis.
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Year Num Funds
Medium Mean Medium Mean Num Stocks Mean
1980 228 53.45 146.74 45.61 122.24 3646 2.27%
1981 226 53.66 137.71 42.11 109.31 3543 2.21%
1982 232 70.64 170.95 50.90 132.00 3393 2.21%
1983 255 97.41 222.14 79.74 182.20 4173 2.74%
1984 270 86.23 221.24 71.98 176.03 3985 2.95%
1985 297 114.12 275.98 89.48 222.04 3845 3.08%
1986 341 106.42 298.47 88.59 241.28 4134 3.46%
1987 376 87.00 286.30 74.03 238.41 4544 3.89%
1988 405 82.47 285.34 69.56 232.77 3906 3.84%
1989 440 95.08 340.49 77.91 265.36 3798 3.92%
1990 480 83.85 306.07 61.95 240.20 3175 4.15%
1991 579 100.23 379.32 79.85 309.56 3548 4.78%
1992 685 115.22 426.04 93.25 346.45 3913 5.39%
1993 925 105.56 442.40 90.00 350.65 4663 6.54%
1994 1044 105.43 450.12 85.19 352.88 4951 6.88%
1995 1168 134.35 610.98 112.60 488.36 5338 9.02%
1996 1314 145.88 750.48 123.31 605.90 5724 10.04%
1997 1480 163.42 933.60 135.21 774.02 5858 11.07%
1998 1570 167.00 1071.47 144.55 927.39 5028 11.81%
1999 1686 187.52 1307.48 164.05 1139.49 4958 12.95%
2000 1890 186.27 1283.93 159.08 1089.54 4698 12.54%
2001 1915 155.22 1018.79 133.73 882.57 3670 13.36%
2002 1970 111.80 771.11 96.53 672.64 3282 13.46%
2003 2001 146.05 976.25 128.51 852.98 3760 13.54%
2004 1961 165.93 1128.54 144.58 978.38 3820 13.82%
2005 1918 196.90 1251.72 169.84 1067.81 3884 14.02%
2006 1789 221.75 1400.29 193.07 1187.58 3858 13.71%
Table I: Summary Statistics of the Mutual Fund Sample (1980-2006)
This  table reports the summary statistics of the mutual fund sample as of December in each year. I exclude 
international, fixed income, and precious metal funds from the sample. The CRSP mutual fund database and the 
CDA/Spectrum database are merged using MFLinks. Num Funds  is the number of actively managed equity mutual 
funds at the end of each year. TNA  is the total net assets under management reported by CRSP. Total Equity 
Holdings  is the total dollar value of equities held by a mutual fund obtained from CDA/Spectrum. % of Market Held 
is the percentage of the U.S. equity market that is held by the mutual funds in this sample.
TNA ($M) Total Equity Holdings ($M) % of Market Held
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]
Intercept -0.059 -0.029 -0.022 -0.022 -0.022 -0.032 0.000 0.020 0.020 0.020
(-6.62) (-1.32) (-0.85) (-0.88) (-0.88) (-3.42) (0.02) (1.22) (1.21) (1.21)
percflow 0.970 1.028 1.107 1.107 1.112 0.618 0.737 0.858 0.855 0.852
(16.82) (17.64) (10.97) (11.27) (11.32) (15.78) (14.64) (10.57) (10.57) (10.33)
own 0.429 -1.196 -1.107 -0.766 -0.471 -0.640
(1.35) (-2.35) (-1.98) (-1.50) (-0.65) (-0.83)
flow * own -2.355 -20.588 -10.539 -12.431 -1.669 -3.384
(-0.58) (-3.25) (-0.87) (-3.74) (-0.51) (-0.50)
liqcost -7.455 -5.755 -5.735 -7.529 -3.416 -3.438
(-2.97) (-5.38) (-5.38) (-3.95) (-4.77) (-4.71)
flow * liqcost -28.559 -13.999 -14.105 -25.748 -8.433 -7.820
(-2.48) (-2.18) (-2.23) (-3.71) (-2.39) (-2.24)
own (fund) 2.171 3.924 3.905 -0.364 0.212 0.278
(3.58) (4.06) (3.95) (-0.44) (0.18) (0.24)
flow * own (fund) 11.265 41.242 37.171 -21.337 -19.235 -17.741
(1.32) (3.10) (2.60) (-3.20) (-2.58) (-2.34)
liqcost (fund) -11.127 -6.084 -6.018 -18.461 -15.505 -15.480
(-1.89) (-1.24) (-1.24) (-3.08) (-2.79) (-2.75)
flow * liqcost (fund) -57.295 -44.609 -45.767 -51.076 -42.332 -41.681
(-1.90) (-1.43) (-1.47) (-3.01) (-2.49) (-2.40)
flow2 * own 19.315 -2.606
(1.08) (-0.39)
flow * (own)2 -70.042 53.280
(-1.00) (1.30)
R2 4.68% 6.31% 6.21% 6.43% 6.43% 9.53% 10.07% 11.36% 11.46% 11.47%
No Obs 1044863 1044863 1044863 1044863 1044863 2215027 2215027 2215027 2215027 2215027
Outflow Inflow
Panel A: DepVar = delta shares (Holding Level Regression)
Table II: Determinants of Partial Scaling (1980-2006)
This table reports the regressions of delta shares  on percflow and a number of variables that may affect the cost of partial 
scaling.  Panel A reports the regression with fund-holding observations, and Panel B reports the regression with portfolio-
average observations. Delta shares(i,j,t)  is the percentage change of shares in stock j  held by fund i   from quarter t -1 to 
quarter t  with split-adjustment. Delta shares(i, t)  is the portfolio weighted average change in shares held. percflow(i, t)  is 
the net capital flow received by fund i  in quarter t  scaled by the fund's total net assets at the end of quarter t -1. % 
held(i,j,t-1)  is the percentage of shares outstanding held by fund i  at the end of quarter t- 1. liq_cost(j,t-1)  is the effective 
half spread estimated from the Basic Market-Adjusted model described in Hasbrouck (2006). %held (fund)  and liq_cost 
(fund) are the portfolio-weighted average ownership share, and the portfolio-weighted average effective spread, 
respectively. high_TNA  is an indicator variable, equal to one if the fund's TNA is above the medium TNA of the mutual 
fund sample in a quarter. exp_flow  is the expected flow computed from the four-factor fund alpha of the prior year. 
Quarter fixed effects are included in every regression specification. T-statistics, shown in parentheses below the 
coefficient estimates, are computed based on standard errors clustered at the fund level. Estimates significant at the 5% 
level are in bold font.
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Intercept -0.099 -0.106 -0.071 -0.205 -0.062 -0.071 -0.051 -0.097
(-15.38) (-16.20) (-7.82) (-6.78) (-7.42) (-8.39) (-4.97) (-12.95)
percflow 0.915 0.902 0.874 0.570 0.617 0.787
(34.17) (31.39) (15.45) (26.23) (26.25) (18.06)
own (fund) 1.806 3.554 2.689 3.175
(4.91) (6.24) (5.83) (5.22)
flow * own (fund) 3.936 -1.455 -17.702 -8.934
(0.97) (-0.28) (-4.19) (-2.24)
liq_cost (fund) -21.139 -18.436
(-7.31) (-6.83)








R2 15.90% 16.29% 19.76% 6.67% 28.26% 29.05% 33.27% 2.44%
No Obs 16765 16765 16765 16406 21671 21671 21671 23129
Panel B: DepVar = delta shares (Fund Level Regression)
Outflow Inflow
Table II (Continued)
Decile Qtr -4 Qtr -3 Qtr -2 Qtr -1 Qtr 0 Qtr 1 Qtr 2 Qtr 3 Qtr 4
1 1.27% 0.81% 0.48% -0.24% -5.50% 0.20% 0.59% 0.61% 1.21%
(3.83) (2.45) (1.56) (-0.76) (-19.31) (0.52) (1.84) (2.42) (4.60)
2 1.24% 0.88% 0.57% -0.01% -2.00% -0.10% 0.39% 0.70% 1.03%
(4.80) (3.21) (2.32) (-0.06) (-10.39) (-0.47) (1.78) (3.34) (4.56)
3 1.35% 1.09% 0.94% 0.50% -0.81% 0.38% 0.75% 1.07% 1.17%
(5.69) (4.56) (4.17) (2.51) (-4.32) (1.94) (3.47) (5.33) (5.46)
4 1.68% 1.47% 1.32% 1.02% 0.09% 0.84% 1.17% 1.28% 1.39%
(7.06) (6.23) (5.86) (4.72) (0.48) (4.13) (5.66) (6.42) (6.69)
5 1.83% 1.83% 1.76% 1.50% 0.92% 1.33% 1.57% 1.65% 1.72%
(7.28) (7.58) (7.10) (6.60) (4.65) (6.16) (7.43) (7.52) (8.16)
6 2.29% 2.31% 2.26% 2.08% 1.81% 1.90% 1.92% 1.96% 1.94%
(8.60) (8.99) (8.82) (8.22) (8.35) (8.05) (8.41) (8.74) (8.74)
7 2.77% 2.69% 2.80% 2.83% 2.82% 2.50% 2.44% 2.32% 2.38%
(9.83) (9.78) (9.72) (9.99) (11.41) (9.72) (9.70) (9.20) (9.73)
8 2.99% 3.26% 3.34% 3.59% 4.18% 3.28% 3.03% 2.76% 2.64%
(10.03) (10.78) (10.19) (10.15) (13.87) (11.10) (10.87) (9.47) (9.97)
9 3.62% 4.05% 4.36% 4.95% 6.46% 4.50% 3.88% 3.51% 3.05%
(11.16) (11.39) (11.41) (11.72) (15.37) (11.68) (11.72) (10.68) (10.28)
10 5.00% 5.88% 6.69% 8.62% 16.76% 8.06% 6.10% 5.25% 4.23%
(13.17) (13.74) (14.37) (13.20) (17.52) (13.39) (13.10) (11.95) (10.65)
10 - 1 3.73% 5.07% 6.21% 8.86% 22.27% 7.86% 5.51% 4.65% 3.02%
(11.00) (13.20) (15.98) (14.37) (22.94) (12.54) (14.91) (15.25) (12.61)
Table III: Flow-Induced Price Pressure (1980-2006)
This table reports the calendar-time returns of stock portfolios sorted by flow-induced price pressure (FIPP ). FIPP  is 
defined as the aggregate flow-induced trading (FIT ) in a quarter scaled by the total shares held by mutual funds at the 
end of the prior quarter. The portfolios are rebalanced every quarter and held for three years. Quarter 0 is the 
formation quarter. Panel A reports the magnitude of FIPP  in each quarter from four quarters before the ranking 
period to four quarter after. Panel B and C report the equal-weighted and value-weighted monthly portfolio returns, 
respectively. To deal with overlapping portfolios in each holding month, I follow Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) to 
take the equal-weighted average return across portfolios formed in different quarters.  Three different monthly returns 
are reported: the return in excess of the risk-free rate, the Fama-French three-factor alpha, and the Carhart four-factor 
alpha. T-statistics, shown in parentheses, are computed based on White's standard errors. Estimates significant at the 
5% level are in bold font.
Panel A: The Magnitude of FIPP from t-4 to t+4
Decile excess alpha_3f alpha_4f excess alpha_3f alpha_4f excess alpha_3f excess alpha_3f
1 0.09% -0.83% -0.64% 0.68% -0.22% 0.06% 0.90% -0.06% 0.92% 0.05%
(0.27) (-6.01) (-5.43) (2.05) (-1.90) (0.63) (2.57) (-0.54) (2.90) (0.67)
2 0.13% -0.79% -0.53% 0.71% -0.23% 0.05% 0.89% -0.06% 0.91% 0.03%
(0.38) (-5.90) (-4.59) (2.19) (-2.06) (0.53) (2.75) (-0.69) (3.00) (0.35)
3 0.37% -0.57% -0.35% 0.73% -0.20% 0.04% 0.92% 0.00% 0.93% 0.04%
(1.10) (-4.72) (-3.31) (2.30) (-1.94) (0.55) (3.01) (0.03) (3.10) (0.54)
4 0.57% -0.38% -0.24% 0.74% -0.16% 0.08% 0.90% 0.00% 0.85% -0.04%
(1.73) (-3.62) (-2.67) (2.36) (-1.62) (1.08) (3.01) (0.02) (2.86) (-0.56)
5 0.66% -0.26% -0.17% 0.74% -0.12% 0.08% 0.88% 0.01% 0.87% -0.03%
(2.10) (-3.03) (-2.24) (2.42) (-1.29) (1.09) (3.04) (0.12) (2.94) (-0.38)
6 0.86% -0.04% 0.01% 0.72% -0.12% 0.10% 0.88% 0.03% 0.81% -0.08%
(2.66) (-0.50) (0.20) (2.31) (-1.29) (1.03) (3.08) (0.41) (2.76) (-1.01)
7 1.00% 0.13% 0.09% 0.76% -0.07% 0.14% 0.80% -0.06% 0.83% -0.07%
(3.15) (1.93) (1.30) (2.42) (-0.69) (1.33) (2.76) (-0.68) (2.81) (-0.70)
8 1.23% 0.37% 0.30% 0.70% -0.07% 0.10% 0.73% -0.11% 0.74% -0.15%
(3.73) (4.98) (3.85) (2.23) (-0.77) (0.93) (2.46) (-1.00) (2.47) (-1.46)
9 1.42% 0.62% 0.52% 0.66% -0.09% 0.05% 0.66% -0.17% 0.74% -0.10%
(4.35) (6.82) (5.12) (2.07) (-0.86) (0.33) (2.11) (-1.30) (2.56) (-0.99)
10 1.82% 1.08% 0.86% 0.66% -0.02% 0.04% 0.49% -0.33% 0.63% -0.17%
(5.21) (8.08) (6.80) (1.94) (-0.16) (0.22) (1.40) (-1.81) (2.10) (-1.36)
10 - 1 1.73% 1.91% 1.50% -0.03% 0.20% -0.02% -0.40% -0.27% -0.30% -0.23%
(7.77) (8.31) (7.38) (-0.17) (1.36) (-0.10) (-2.46) (-1.46) (-2.70) (-2.10)
Table III (Continued)
Panel B: Equal-Weighted Portfolio Returns Sorted by FIPP
Qtr 0 (Formation Qtr) Qtr 1-4 Qtr 5-8 Qtr 5-12
Decile excess alpha_3f alpha_4f excess alpha_3f alpha_4f excess alpha_3f excess alpha_3f
1 -0.22% -1.05% -0.82% 0.73% -0.09% -0.02% 0.87% 0.19% 0.82% 0.19%
(-0.67) (-5.80) (-4.50) (2.52) (-0.88) (-0.16) (3.04) (1.83) (2.91) (1.99)
2 0.01% -0.80% -0.57% 0.76% -0.06% 0.02% 0.89% 0.22% 0.83% 0.19%
(0.04) (-5.60) (-3.82) (2.72) (-0.52) (0.20) (3.25) (1.95) (3.13) (2.14)
3 0.26% -0.57% -0.45% 0.79% 0.02% 0.06% 0.84% 0.18% 0.76% 0.10%
(0.90) (-4.23) (-3.43) (2.96) (0.17) (0.56) (3.23) (2.12) (3.02) (1.60)
4 0.47% -0.29% -0.19% 0.72% -0.01% 0.02% 0.81% 0.14% 0.76% 0.11%
(1.69) (-2.63) (-1.86) (2.75) (-0.06) (0.22) (3.16) (1.92) (3.08) (1.27)
5 0.58% -0.18% -0.15% 0.71% 0.03% 0.10% 0.82% 0.18% 0.78% 0.16%
(2.00) (-1.75) (-1.55) (2.60) (0.38) (1.55) (3.09) (2.10) (3.03) (1.96)
6 0.88% 0.15% 0.04% 0.60% -0.08% -0.01% 0.67% -0.01% 0.66% -0.02%
(2.99) (1.33) (0.42) (2.08) (-0.95) (-0.17) (2.55) (-0.11) (2.57) (-0.46)
7 1.04% 0.32% 0.06% 0.61% -0.04% 0.01% 0.66% -0.02% 0.63% -0.04%
(3.32) (2.47) (0.46) (2.05) (-0.36) (0.07) (2.35) (-0.21) (2.35) (-0.62)
8 1.41% 0.74% 0.49% 0.60% 0.00% -0.09% 0.51% -0.13% 0.53% -0.13%
(4.25) (4.99) (3.25) (1.88) (-0.02) (-0.74) (1.75) (-1.11) (1.90) (-1.42)
9 1.71% 1.04% 0.68% 0.52% -0.09% -0.27% 0.33% -0.29% 0.40% -0.26%
(4.60) (5.70) (4.10) (1.54) (-0.68) (-1.85) (1.02) (-2.04) (1.36) (-2.31)
10 1.90% 1.26% 0.93% 0.64% 0.05% -0.22% 0.21% -0.35% 0.36% -0.23%
(4.81) (6.16) (4.65) (1.75) (0.36) (-1.46) (0.61) (-2.12) (1.16) (-1.89)
10 - 1 2.12% 2.31% 1.76% -0.08% 0.15% -0.21% -0.66% -0.54% -0.46% -0.42%
(5.96) (6.78) (5.11) (-0.35) (0.68) (-0.93) (-3.04) (-2.85) (-2.80) (-2.61)
Table III (Continued)
Panel C: Value-Weighted Portfolio Returns Sorted by FIPP
Qtr 0 (Formation Qtr) Qtr 1-4 Qtr 5-8 Qtr 5-12
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Intercept 0.028 0.028 0.312 0.010 0.016 0.014 0.375 0.007
(5.38) (5.77) (13.39) (3.65) (25.89) (18.77) (20.12) (7.72)
alpha(t-4,t-1) 4.827 1.766 15.242 0.953 4.232 2.453 10.069 1.330
(9.67) (4.38) (4.29) (4.47) (9.02) (9.15) (4.17) (5.43)
adjret(t-4,t-1) 0.396 0.229 0.202 0.089













R2 4.53% 7.70% 7.15% 24.79% 5.25% 7.14% 7.79% 19.83%
No Obs 93629 93629 93629 93629 93629 93629 93629 93629
Dependent Variable = percflow(t)
Table VI: Determinants of Expected Flows (1980-2006)
This table reports the regression of percflow(t)  on alpha(t-4,t-1) , adjret(t-4,t-1),  and lagged percflow. percflow(t)  is 
the dollar flow to a mutual fund in quarter t scaled by the fund's TNA  at the end of quarter t -1. alpha(t-4,t-1)  is the 
Carhart four-factor alpha computed from the fund's monthly returns in the prior year. adjret(t-4,t-1)  is the cumulative 
market-adjusted fund return in the prior year. The coefficients are estimated both with the Fama-MacBeth approach 
and with a pooled OLS regression. Standard errors for the Fama-MacBeth estimates are computed with the Newey-
West correction of four lags. For the pooled OLS, quarter fixed effects are included in every regression specification 
and standard errors are clustered at the fund level. T-statistics are shown in parentheses. Estimates significant at the 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































decile excess alpha_3f alpha_4f excess alpha_3f alpha_4f excess alpha_3f excess alpha_3f
1 0.58% -0.13% -0.09% 0.63% -0.09% -0.10% 0.75% 0.15% 0.72% 0.13%
(1.96) (-1.48) (-0.95) (2.20) (-1.38) (-1.37) (2.61) (2.41) (2.57) (2.41)
2 0.65% -0.05% -0.03% 0.67% -0.03% -0.05% 0.67% 0.07% 0.66% 0.06%
(2.35) (-0.81) (-0.54) (2.48) (-0.66) (-0.89) (2.48) (1.41) (2.51) (1.32)
3 0.66% -0.04% -0.02% 0.69% -0.01% -0.02% 0.61% 0.01% 0.62% 0.01%
(2.44) (-0.69) (-0.39) (2.64) (-0.12) (-0.35) (2.35) (0.27) (2.46) (0.21)
4 0.69% 0.01% 0.02% 0.70% 0.01% 0.00% 0.63% 0.02% 0.63% 0.02%
(2.60) (0.28) (0.34) (2.70) (0.14) (-0.01) (2.43) (0.65) (2.55) (0.60)
5 0.71% 0.04% 0.04% 0.70% 0.02% 0.02% 0.63% 0.02% 0.63% 0.02%
(2.71) (0.83) (0.80) (2.74) (0.45) (0.38) (2.47) (0.66) (2.58) (0.49)
6 0.70% 0.02% 0.01% 0.73% 0.05% 0.04% 0.64% 0.03% 0.62% 0.01%
(2.64) (0.55) (0.30) (2.82) (1.42) (1.07) (2.50) (0.90) (2.53) (0.24)
7 0.73% 0.06% 0.05% 0.76% 0.07% 0.07% 0.66% 0.05% 0.65% 0.03%
(2.74) (1.39) (1.16) (2.92) (1.86) (1.71) (2.58) (1.52) (2.63) (0.83)
8 0.78% 0.12% 0.09% 0.78% 0.11% 0.10% 0.65% 0.03% 0.66% 0.04%
(2.81) (2.57) (1.96) (2.94) (2.55) (2.28) (2.46) (0.73) (2.62) (0.92)
9 0.83% 0.17% 0.14% 0.82% 0.15% 0.13% 0.68% 0.08% 0.66% 0.04%
(2.87) (3.35) (2.52) (2.94) (3.17) (2.65) (2.50) (1.58) (2.52) (0.83)
10 1.04% 0.40% 0.30% 0.98% 0.33% 0.27% 0.66% 0.09% 0.67% 0.07%
(2.98) (4.28) (3.05) (2.95) (4.47) (3.39) (2.08) (1.16) (2.23) (0.97)
10 - 1 0.46% 0.52% 0.39% 0.35% 0.42% 0.37% -0.08% -0.06% -0.05% -0.07%
(3.36) (4.00) (3.19) (3.32) (4.51) (3.89) (-0.95) (-0.68) (-0.74) (-0.76)
Table VI: Mutual Fund Performance Persistence (1980-2006)
Panel A reports the calendar-time returns of mutual fund portfolios sorted by the four-factor fund alpha in the prior 
year. Panel B reports the calendar-time portfolio returns first sorted by E[FIPP*]  and then by the four-factor fund 
alpha, and Panel C reports the calendar-time portfolio returns first sorted by the four-factor fund alpha and then by 
E[FIPP*] . E[FIPP*] is the portfolio-weighted average expected flow-induced price pressure. The portfolios are 
rebalanced every quarter and held for up to three years. To deal with overlapping portfolios in each holding month, I 
follow Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) to take the equal-weighted average return across portfolios formed in different 
quarters. Three different monthly returns are reported: the return in excess of the risk-free rate, the Fama-French three-
factor alpha, and the Carhart four-factor alpha. T-statistics, shown in parentheses, are computed based on White's 
standard errors. Estimates significant at the 5% level are in bold font.
Panel A: Mutual Fund Performance Persistence (Sort by the Four-Factor Fund Alpha)










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































decile excess alpha_3f alpha_4f excess alpha_3f alpha_4f excess alpha_3f excess alpha_3f
1 0.69% -0.06% -0.05% 0.79% 0.05% 0.02% 0.75% 0.14% 0.73% 0.12%
(2.40) (-0.82) (-0.67) (2.84) (0.82) (0.27) (2.69) (2.79) (2.70) (2.66)
2 0.69% -0.01% 0.02% 0.73% 0.02% 0.00% 0.73% 0.12% 0.70% 0.09%
(2.52) (-0.20) (0.33) (2.73) (0.40) (0.07) (2.70) (2.71) (2.66) (2.16)
3 0.71% 0.01% 0.03% 0.72% 0.02% 0.01% 0.67% 0.05% 0.66% 0.04%
(2.61) (0.21) (0.48) (2.75) (0.41) (0.10) (2.55) (1.36) (2.60) (1.14)
4 0.72% 0.04% 0.06% 0.72% 0.04% 0.04% 0.62% 0.01% 0.63% 0.01%
(2.67) (0.97) (1.22) (2.76) (0.97) (0.99) (2.40) (0.24) (2.50) (0.17)
5 0.72% 0.04% 0.05% 0.72% 0.04% 0.04% 0.64% 0.03% 0.63% 0.02%
(2.65) (1.02) (1.16) (2.73) (0.91) (0.85) (2.45) (0.92) (2.52) (0.52)
6 0.70% 0.04% 0.02% 0.72% 0.04% 0.03% 0.62% 0.02% 0.61% 0.01%
(2.54) (0.81) (0.49) (2.70) (1.08) (0.76) (2.36) (0.49) (2.44) (0.17)
7 0.71% 0.03% 0.01% 0.72% 0.03% 0.02% 0.65% 0.04% 0.63% 0.02%
(2.56) (0.73) (0.12) (2.68) (0.80) (0.54) (2.47) (1.11) (2.47) (0.40)
8 0.73% 0.07% 0.03% 0.74% 0.06% 0.04% 0.64% 0.02% 0.65% 0.02%
(2.61) (1.51) (0.60) (2.70) (1.49) (0.88) (2.38) (0.51) (2.51) (0.60)
9 0.78% 0.11% 0.06% 0.75% 0.06% 0.03% 0.61% 0.00% 0.63% 0.00%
(2.70) (2.34) (0.82) (2.68) (1.39) (0.66) (2.24) (0.03) (2.42) (0.08)
10 0.86% 0.22% 0.10% 0.78% 0.12% 0.06% 0.60% -0.01% 0.61% -0.01%
(2.85) (3.29) (1.25) (2.71) (2.39) (0.97) (2.12) (-0.19) (2.27) (-0.18)
10 - 1 0.17% 0.28% 0.15% -0.01% 0.08% 0.04% -0.15% -0.15% -0.13% -0.13%
(1.72) (2.74) (1.58) (-0.08) (1.27) (0.61) (-3.05) (-2.63) (-3.26) (-2.68)
Table VII: The Smart Money Effect (1980-2006)
Panel A reports the calendar-time returns of mutual fund portfolios sorted by the fund flow in each quarter. Panel B 
reports the calendar-time portfolio returns independently sorted by E[FIPP*]  and fund flows in each quarter. 
E[FIPP*] is the portfolio-weighted average expected flow-induced price pressure. The portfolios are rebalanced every 
quarter and held for up to three years. To deal with overlapping portfolios in each holding month, I follow Jegadeesh 
and Titman (1993) to take the equal-weighted average return across portfolios formed in different quarters. Three 
different monthly returns are reported: the return in excess of the risk-free rate, the Fama-French three-factor alpha, 
and the Carhart four-factor alpha. T-statistics, shown in parentheses, are computed based on White's standard errors. 
Estimates significant at the 5% level are in bold font.
Panel A: The Smart Money Effect (Sort by Fund Flow)










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Intercept 0.050 0.053 0.053 0.049 0.051 0.051
(5.47) (5.85) (5.69) (5.20) (5.48) (5.30)
E[FIPP*] 3.081 2.602 2.952 2.687
(3.06) (2.35) (2.93) (2.43)
alpha 0.581 0.042 0.005
(3.82) (0.24) (0.03)
flow 0.012 0.004 0.004
(2.28) (0.82) (0.93)
epxenses -0.351 -0.830 -0.765 -0.319 -0.657 -0.653
(-0.27) (-0.55) (-0.48) (-0.26) (-0.51) (-0.52)
log(age) 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.17) (0.47) (0.63) (0.37) (0.65) (0.84)
log(no_stocks) 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(3.58) (3.95) (3.72) (3.27) (3.44) (3.02)
log(TNA) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(-1.91) (-2.18) (-2.18) (-1.82) (-2.08) (-2.00)
log(turnover) 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001
(2.05) (1.76) (1.56) (1.96) (2.06) (1.96)
R2 15.77% 11.03% 8.06% 17.46% 16.53% 18.24%
No Obs 80182 80182 80182 80182 80182 80182
Table VIII: Mutual Fund Performance Predictability (1980-2006)
This table reports the regression of quarterly mutual fund returns on E[FIPP*], alpha, flow, expenses, log(age), 
log(no_stocks), log(TNA), and log(turnover).  E[FIPP*]  is the portfolio-weighted average expected flow-induced 
price pressure (E[FIPP] ) computed from the four-factor fund alpha in the previous year. alpha  is the Carhart four-
factor fund alpha in the previous year. flow  is the log percentage flow in the previous quarter. expenses  is the 
expense ratio in the previous quarter. age  is the number of years since fund inception. no_stocks  is the number of 
stocks in the portfolio. TNA  is the total net assets of the fund. Finally, turnover  is the turnover ratio in the previous 
quarter. The regression coefficients are estimated using the Fama-MacBeth approach. T-statistics, shown in 
parentheses, are computed based on standard errors with the Newey-West correction of up to four lags. Estimates 
significant at the 5% level are in bold font.
Dependent Variable = ret(t+1)
Table IX: Momentum (1980-2006)
This table reports the regression of the quarterly or monthly stock return on E[FIPP(t-k+1,t)], ret(t), ret(t-k, t-1), ret(-
36, t-k-1), bm,  log(mktcap), and turnover.  ret(m,n)  is the cumulative stock return from month m  to n . E[FIPP] is the 
aggregate expected flow-induced trading (E[FIT] ) in a quarter scaled by the total shares held by mutual funds at the 
end of the quarter. The expected capital flow in a quarter is estimated from the market-adjusted fund return in the 
previous k  months. bm  and mktcap  are the book-to-market ratio and the market capitalization at the end of the 
quarter, respectively. turnover  is the average monthly turnover in the previous year. Columns 1-6 in Panel A and the 
entire Panel B report the regression results with quarterly stock returns, while Columns 7-10 in Panel A report the 
same regression with monthly stock returns. Panel B divides the full sample into two halves based on either time 
periods or market capitalizations. Small and large stocks are classified based on the medium market capitalization of 
NYSE stocks in the prior quarter. The coefficients are estimated using the Fama-MacBeth approach. T-statistics, 
shown in parentheses, are computed based on White's standard errors. Estimates significant at the 5% level are in bold 
font.
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]
Intercept 0.103 0.092 0.096 0.077 0.094 0.084 0.133 0.124 0.047 0.042
(2 81) (2 36) (2 63) (2 01) (2 58) (2 34) (2 91) (2 65) (4 07) (3 54)
Panel A: Full Sample
Dependent Variable = ret(t+1)
k=6 (Feb-Dec)
Dependent Variable = ret(t+1, t+3)
k=12 (80-06) k=6 (80-06) k=3 (80-06) k=6 (Jan)
. . . . . . . . . .
E[FIPP(t-k+1, t)] 0.085 0.145 0.250 0.084 0.044
(3.07) (2.93) (3.32) (1.60) (2.91)
ret(t) -0.024 -0.029 -0.024 -0.030 -0.020 -0.029 -0.091 -0.095 -0.038 -0.040
(-1.67) (-2.16) (-1.63) (-2.26) (-1.35) (-2.18) (-5.31) (-5.76) (-6.80) (-7.58)
ret(t-k, t-1) 0.020 0.015 0.027 0.020 0.024 0.014 -0.011 -0.013 0.008 0.005
(4.06) (3.31) (3.59) (2.82) (2.29) (1.40) (-0.94) (-1.17) (2.47) (1.93)
ret(t-36,  t-k-1) -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.001 -0.001
(-3.19) (-3.05) (-2.64) (-2.56) (-2.54) (-2.54) (-3.25) (-3.61) (-2.11) (-2.00)
bm 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.002
(1.33) (1.37) (1.25) (1.42) (1.40) (1.78) (0.31) (1.10) (1.16) (1.46)
log(mktcap) -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.005 -0.005 -0.002 -0.001
(-2.16) (-1.73) (-1.96) (-1.33) (-1.88) (-1.59) (-2.75) (-2.42) (-3.43) (-2.91)
0 004 0 00 0 004 0 004 0 004 0 004 0 003 0 002 0 001 0 001turnover - . - . 5 - . - . - . - . . . - . - .
(-2.02) (-2.26) (-1.87) (-2.06) (-1.63) (-2.05) (0.93) (0.83) (-1.24) (-1.66)
R2 7.08% 7.85% 6.75% 7.85% 6.38% 7.88% 8.32% 9.02% 6.46% 7.36%
No Obs 223268 223268 223268 223268 223268 223268 54383 54383 606112 606112
Please note that the unit of t  is a month in this table.
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Intercept 0.072 0.065 0.119 0.090 0.653 0.631 0.223 0.190
(1.37) (1.29) (2.54) (1.65) (5.53) (5.16) (5.84) (4.28)
E[FIPP(t-k+1, t)] 0.106 0.203 0.158 0.175
(1.80) (3.44) (3.50) (3.35)
ret(t) -0.022 -0.027 -0.022 -0.029 -0.012 -0.018 -0.031 -0.041
(-1.10) (-1.43) (-1.07) (-1.60) (-0.85) (-1.39) (-1.55) (-2.36)
ret(t-k, t-1) 0.032 0.027 0.023 0.014 0.035 0.028 0.021 0.011
(2.77) (2.75) (2.44) (1.92) (4.82) (4.62) (3.10) (1.57)
ret(t-36,  t-k-1) -0.003 -0.003 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003
(-1.83) (-1.83) (-4.13) (-4.11) (-2.41) (-2.27) (-1.68) (-1.62)
bm 0.004 0.003 0.007 0.008 0.006 0.006 0.002 0.003
(0.78) (0.77) (1.12) (1.36) (1.45) (1.47) (0.43) (0.86)
log(mktcap) -0.002 -0.001 -0.004 -0.003 -0.033 -0.032 -0.008 -0.007
(-0.76) (-0.60) (-2.21) (-1.35) (-6.47) (-6.12) (-5.57) (-3.93)
turnover -0.007 -0.007 -0.001 -0.001 -0.006 -0.006 -0.001 -0.002
(-2.23) (-2.31) (-0.29) (-0.41) (-2.49) (-2.73) (-0.44) (-0.84)
R2 7.76% 8.44% 5.69% 6.99% 6.78% 7.55% 8.81% 9.96%
No Obs 72946 72946 150322 150322 104970 104970 118298 118298
Please note that the unit of t  is a month in this table.
Table IX: Momentum (Continued)
k=6 (80-93) k=6 (94-06) k=6 (Small Cap) k=6 (Large Cap)
Dependent Variable = ret(t+1, t+3)
Panel B: Subsamples Based on Time Periods and Firm Size
1 2 3 4 5 1 - 3 5 - 3 1 5
ret_grp 0.183 0.103 0.096 0.129 0.207 0.087 0.111 0.178 0.202
(6.99) (4.71) (6.50) (8.69) (8.28) (2.48) (4.54) (6.74) (7.88)
ret_opp -0.045 -0.032
(-1.72) (-1.74)
ret_ffind 0.346 0.420 0.445 0.418 0.332 -0.099 -0.112 0.348 0.330
(12.45) (27.04) (44.59) (32.74) (18.50) (-4.09) (-5.43) (12.93) (18.47)
mktrf 0.402 0.399 0.395 0.398 0.389 0.008 -0.006 0.453 0.434
(13.14) (16.28) (17.15) (13.99) (9.71) (0.27) (-0.21) (9.65) (9.99)
smb 0.665 0.582 0.537 0.597 0.664 0.128 0.127 0.697 0.685
(27.21) (37.73) (47.82) (27.98) (15.97) (5.91) (3.39) (22.52) (16.12)
hml 0.159 0.146 0.162 0.156 0.148 -0.003 -0.015 0.150 0.149
(7.93) (7.79) (8.08) (5.91) (4.73) (-0.17) (-0.70) (7.67) (5.05)
umd -0.100 -0.071 -0.059 -0.046 -0.029 -0.041 0.030 -0.105 -0.030
(-8.51) (-7.22) (-5.44) (-3.65) (-2.56) (-2.80) (2.92) (-8.82) (-3.34)
1 2 3 4 5 1 - 3 5 - 3
ret_grp 0.164 0.112 0.120 0.127 0.197 0.044 0.077
(7.08) (7.31) (13.05) (12.89) (9.66) (1.87) (3.74)
ret_ffind 0.310 0.382 0.401 0.373 0.274 -0.092 -0.127
(10.43) (20.58) (30.57) (27.93) (16.92) (-4.07) (-6.58)
mktrf 0.437 0.422 0.402 0.426 0.431 0.035 0.030
(12.53) (17.96) (18.13) (13.41) (11.15) (1.55) (1.16)
smb 0.612 0.539 0.506 0.561 0.602 0.107 0.096
(32.13) (42.30) (46.44) (25.07) (16.79) (5.25) (3.28)
hml 0.163 0.159 0.167 0.155 0.160 -0.004 -0.007
(6.92) (8.72) (8.84) (6.78) (5.16) (-0.24) (-0.39)
umd -0.059 -0.062 -0.047 -0.034 -0.024 -0.013 0.023
(-4.90) (-8.83) (-8.31) (-4.39) (-3.15) (-1.07) (3.03)
Quintiles of Gamma
This table reports the regression of ret(j, t)  on (contemporaneous) ret(grp, t) , ret(opp, t) , ret(ffind, t) , ret(mktrf, t) , 
ret(smb, t) , ret(hml, t),  and ret(umd, t).  In each quarter, I sort all stocks into quintiles based on the stock quality 
measure (Gamma ) proposed in Cohen, Coval, and Pastor (2005) and Wermers, Yao, and Zhao (2007). ret(grp, t) is 
the return of the quintile portfolio to which stock j  belongs;  ret(ffind, t)  is the return of the industry portfolio (based 
on the Fama-French 48 industry definition) to which stock j  belongs, ret(mktrf, t), ret(smb, t),  and ret(hml, t) are 
Fama-French market, size, and value factor returns, and ret(umd, t) is the momentum factor return. For stocks in 
quintiles 1 and 5, I also include ret(opp,t)  in the regression, which is the return of the opposite quintile portfolio. All 
portfolio returns are computed on a value-weighted basis, and for ret(grp, t)  and  ret(ffind, t) , I exclude the stock 
being analyzed from the calculation. The regression is conducted for each stock at the end of each quarter using 
weekly (Panel A) or daily (Panel B) returns in the subsequent year. I then take the cross-sectional averages of the 
regression coefficients at the end of each quarter. Finally, I report the time series averages of these estimates and their 
t-statistics (shown in parentheses) based on standard errors with the Newey-West correction of four lags. Estimates 
significant at the 5% level are in bold font.
Table X: Comovement (1980-2006)
Panel A: Weekly Returns
Quintiles of Gamma
Panel B: Daily Returns
decile alpha_3f alpha_4f alpha_3f alpha_4f alpha_3f alpha_4f alpha_3f alpha_4f
1 -0.17% -0.08% -0.67% -0.36% -0.49% -0.39% -0.37% -0.13%
(-1.38) (-0.63) (-2.69) (-1.57) (-1.44) (-1.44) (-2.26) (-0.85)
2 -0.12% -0.07% -0.50% -0.29% -0.35% -0.29% -0.31% -0.16%
(-1.34) (-0.69) (-2.93) (-2.00) (-1.24) (-1.19) (-2.70) (-1.55)
3 -0.16% -0.10% -0.39% -0.23% -0.27% -0.21% -0.28% -0.17%
(-1.94) (-1.13) (-2.48) (-1.64) (-1.26) (-1.24) (-2.69) (-1.76)
4 -0.07% -0.03% -0.19% -0.08% -0.03% 0.01% -0.15% -0.09%
(-1.05) (-0.46) (-1.41) (-0.61) (-0.19) (0.10) (-1.76) (-1.17)
5 -0.03% 0.01% -0.08% 0.00% -0.08% -0.03% -0.05% -0.04%
(-0.39) (0.13) (-0.65) (-0.01) (-0.48) (-0.21) (-0.63) (-0.47)
6 -0.15% -0.12% -0.12% 0.01% -0.16% -0.09% -0.12% -0.09%
(-2.28) (-1.60) (-0.92) (0.11) (-0.71) (-0.52) (-1.78) (-1.28)
7 -0.01% 0.08% 0.08% 0.10% 0.16% 0.20% 0.01% 0.01%
(-0.07) (1.05) (0.68) (0.90) (1.05) (1.33) (0.19) (0.11)
8 0.15% 0.20% 0.25% 0.24% 0.27% 0.27% 0.17% 0.14%
(2.01) (2.76) (2.09) (2.01) (1.56) (1.56) (2.04) (1.66)
9 0.11% 0.10% 0.28% 0.25% 0.30% 0.32% 0.15% 0.05%
(1.42) (1.26) (1.90) (1.68) (1.25) (1.30) (1.49) (0.48)
10 0.46% 0.40% 0.52% 0.36% 0.74% 0.69% 0.39% 0.29%
(3.78) (3.65) (3.13) (2.27) (2.89) (2.89) (3.45) (2.48)
10 - 1 0.63% 0.48% 1.19% 0.71% 1.23% 1.08% 0.75% 0.42%
(3.48) (2.92) (3.37) (3.32) (2.45) (2.77) (3.39) (1.97)
This table reports the equal-weighted calendar-time returns of stock portfolios sorted by expected flow-induced price 
pressure (E[FIPP] ).  E[FIPP]  is computed as the aggregate expected flow-induced trading (E[FIT] ) in a quarter 
scaled by the total shares held by all mutual funds at the end of the quarter. The expected capital flow in a quarter is 
estimated from the four-factor fund alpha in the prior year. I divide the full sample into two halves based on time 
periods (1980-1993 vs. 1994-2006) or calendar quarters (first calendar quarter vs. the remaining three quarters). The 
portfolios are rebalanced every quarter and are held for one quarter. Both the Fama-French three-factor alpha and the 
Carhart four-factor alpha are reported. T-statistics, shown in parentheses, are computed based on White's standard 
errors. Estimates significant at the 5% level are in bold font.
Table XI: Subsample Robustness of E[FIPP] (1980-2006)
1980 - 1993 1994 - 2006 1st Calendar Qtr Other Calendar Qtrs
Subsamples Based on Time Periods and Calendar Quarters
